WartfeVl  L'kar^ 


SYLLABUS 


-OF- 


PROF.    PATTON'S    LECTURES 


ON- 


THEISM 


irRXiTa?Ei3,    3^0 T    2=-crsxjis:^EiD. 


(Hje    Jriiutton    JP'^^^s. 
1888. 


•yip^i^i^ 


Warlield  Library 


SYLLABUS 


^y 


PROF.    PATTON'S    LECTURES 


ON- 


THEISM 


I*DEaX2^rXEX),     3^0X     I^XTSIjISHEXD. 


je    Jriuctton    grtBs. 
188  8. 


DEC  S9192i 


rii 


rHElSM 


INTODUCTOKY 


Theism  iniiv  be  considered  reliu^iously  or  philosophically. 
From  the  standpoint  of  relii^ious  belief  men  may  be  re- 
garded as  believing  or  not  believini^  in  God. 


Thus : 

1.  Theism. 


iPolytlioisni. 
r*aiitlieisin. 
Moiiotlieisni.  = 


.  Theism 
par  exellencp. 
3.   Atheism. 

Theism,  philosophically  considered,  is  a  theory  of  the 
universe  afHrming  the  existence  of  one  Infinite,  Personal 
God  ;  the  Creator,  I'reserver,  and  Ruler  of  the  Universe. 
The  theistic  conception  of  the  universe  implies  three  things: 

1.  A  finite,  personal,  and  permanent  self;  or  ego. 

2.  A  totality  of  objective  phenomena;  or  cosmos.     ' 

3.  An  infinite  personal  author  of  all  dependent  existence; 

or  God. 

Opposed  to  Theism  in  this  view  of  the  subject  would  stand 
Anti-theism  in  its  various  forms. 

Adopting  this  philosophical  c()nce[)tion  of  Theism,  we 
shall  carry  on  the  discussion  under  tliree  main  divisions : 
Historical ;  Constructive  ;  Polemic. 

PART  I.     HISTORICAL. 

Three  topics  fall  under  this  head  : 

1.  The  phenomenology  of  Theism. 

2.  The  genesis  of  Theism. 

3.  The  discussion  of  Theism. 

I.     'i'liE  Phknomenology  or  Theism. 

A.  The  Theism  of  the  three  great  historic  monotheistic 
religions:    Mohammedanism,  C'bristianity,  Judaism. 

The  discussion  here  concerns  tlie  purely  monotheistic 
character  of  Judaism.  This  has  been  attacked  —  though  as 
Ochler  (Theo.  of  O.  T.  ii.  150)  shews,  without  success — by 


2 

a«em,)ting  to  prove  („)  Thnt  .) 

;vo..n<i  itself  tiomV;iSi    l^«  ';.':;*-^-."''«'"J,graduall,-u.,. 

P>nlv;.    ^'"^  J*'"'"  *''<-'t8  Of  the  or     *      <^:?s'ence  of  other 
Po]ythmsm  seen,  to  bo  tl.ese  regarding  Theism  and 

thoisn..  '"'"^-^  *°  '■'•■'"I'so  mto  idohnr^-  or  Poly 

,    „,;-'^'"- of  nature.  "^-'"""-^  '"'^^■'' o.i  an  animistic 

"•   -lliat  a  complex  rdi.ri 

'"•  o?the";':::;!i|:;?-"'^  Monotheism 

'•4osit!:;f'ti;;.:T"*'---na 

^ionothei.m  ""'"■>'   ^'0™ 

'^M:;;c;jf:4r;jji-s«,.tcm, 
,,   .  Slt-^od^-"'^^^^^^^ 

toliijP'K-'-'-'  --on  ot  this...  ,.,.,., 

•"•   i  lio  Theism  of  comparative  Th<.  .1 
Accon   n<'  to  tini,  ,  •        "'""^e  Ihoology. 

tion  nr         ''■''.'"'"  '"  t''e«e  theis  h.  f/'''T'''''''''-^'  "^  I'xlia 


1 


C.  The  Theism  of  speculative  philosophy. 
Aocordiii,*;*    to   wliieh  God  is   rc'ii;ur(le(l  simply  as  a  livpo- 
thesis  for  "-iviiii::  rational  exi)laiiati()ii  of  the  universe. 

ir.     The  Genesis  of  Theis.m. 

There  are  four  generic  theories  in  explanation  of  our  idea 
of  God,  nam  el}' : 

1.  Development.  2.  Revelation. 

3.  Inference.  4.  Intuition. 

These  are  to  be  considered  in  their  order. 

First  Theory.     Development. 

By  which  is  meant  that  Monotheism  sustains  genetic  re- 
lations to  antecedent  impure  or  less  pure  forms  of  belief. 
This  theory  assumes  several  forms. 

A.     Hume. 

Polytheism,  according  to  II.,  is  prior  to  Monotheism. 
The  advance  out  of  the  one  into  the  other  is  not  due  to 
philosophic  reflection  and  a  growing  appreciation  of  the 
unity  of  nature,  but  is  explained  by  the  tendency  to  flatter 
a  local  deity,  to  impute  greatness,  and  so  by  degrees  to  in- 
vest him  with  the  attribute  of  inflnity.  A  view  lacking 
every  element  of  plausibility,  and  speculatively  worthless. 

B.       COMPTE. 

The  theory  under  notice  is  credited  to  Compte,  not  because 
he  is  the  originator  of  the  term  fetich,  nor  yet  because  he 
has  given  the  best  account  of  fetichistic  religions — for  this 
distinction  is  due  to  F.  Schultze,  (Fetichismus) — but  because 
Compte  flrst  presented  in  reasoned  form  the  doctrine  that 
all  religion  begins  in  Fetichism  and  passes  thence  through 
Polytheism  to  Monotheism.  Discussing  the  fetich-theory 
of  religion  (1)  inquire  into  the  origin  and  meaning  of  the 
word  fetich,  and  (2)  consider  reasons  for  and  against  this 
view. 

Account  of  the  word  given  in  Max  MuUer's  ITibbert 
Lectures,  p.  54.  Introduced  by  De  Bross,  1760.  Origin  of 
the  word  found  in  the  custom  of  Portuguese  navigators,  who 
called  the  inanimate  objects  worshipped  by  the  people  of 
West  Africa — feiticos. 


Word  used,  though  improperly,  with  great  latitude, 
Schultzc  speaks  of  mountains,  water,  etc.,  as  fetiches; 
Tiele,  of  Heaven  as  a  feticli.  Compte  gives  the  doctrine  of 
'anima  mundi  as  illustration  of  fetich  worship.  And  so  an 
ohject  of  special  regard  is  termed  a  fetich  ;  a  child's  doll ; 
a  lock  of  hair;  and  by  way  of  reproach,  a  theological  opin- 
ion; the  Protestant's  Bible;  the  Roman  Catholic  wafer. 
This  is  wrong.  The  word  is  properly  used  to  describe  the 
worship  of  tangible,  inanimate  objects. 

So  regarding  it,  consider  the  reasons  for  calling  it  the 
earliest  form  of  religion  : 

a.  It  is  the  lowest  form.  What  is  lowest  was  anterior. 
But  this  needs  proof. 

b.  Savages  and  uncivilized  races  are  types  of  primitive 
man.     But  this  assumes  there  has  been  no  degradation. 

0.  Empirical  philosophy  is  under  obligation  to  expound 
a  natural  history  of  religion.  But  this  necessity  is  only 
condition  by  the  exigencies  of  an  erroneous  philosophy. 

As  to  the  value  of  the  theory,  it  is,  however,  to  be  re- 
marked : 

1.  It  does  not  satisfy  one  of  the  leading  evolutionists,  Mr. 

Spencer. 

2.  It  is  ditticult  to  determine,  from  the  evidence  furnished 

by  savage  tribes,  whether  the  Fetich  is  a  determina- 
tion of  a  general  belief  in  God,  or  whether  the  larger 
belief  in  God  is  developed  out  of  fetich-worship  : 
whether  belief  in  God  is  the  logical  prius  of  the  fetich 
or  vice  versn. 

3.  And  though  the  people  of  W.  Africa  had  no  knowledge 

of  God  at  all,  there  is  nothing  to  shov/  that  this  con- 
dition is  not  due  to  a  degradation  from  a  primitive 
faith. 

4.  Tlif  literature  of  India  [U'oves  thiit  there  was  a  prim- 

iti\e  Monotheism  or  l[enotheism  lying  back  of  the 
Polytheism  of  a  later  day. 
6.  Spencer's  criticism  is  good.  Before  the  savage  can 
invest  this  or  that  stick  or  rag  with  life,  he  must 
have  a  general  animistic  conception.  Spencer  is 
trying  to  show  that  the  ghost-theory  is  the  true  the- 
ory ami  that  belief  in  ghosts  antedates  belief  in  the 
fetirli.  What  is  good  against  fetichism  in  favor  of 
ancestor  worship  is  good  also  against  fetichism  in  fa- 
vor of  primiti\«'  Tlicism. 


C.     Herbert  Si'encer. 

The  primitive  rclijLcion,  ucconliiiir  to  this  thiiikcr,  was 
ancestor-worship.  llaving  in  droanis  come  to  a  knowl- 
edge ot  liis  second  self,  that  is,  having  reached  the  helief  in 
the  soul,  the  step  was  easy  to  helief  in  the  continued  con- 
scious existence  of  the  dei)arted.  Hence  ancestor- worship. 
And  Mr.  8pencer  is  at  great  pains  to  show  how  what  hegan 
as  worship  of  ancestors  in  time  took  on  the  form  of  wor- 
ship [>aid  to  plants,  animals,  the  heavenly  bodies  and  finally 
the  infinite  God. 

Genenral  Considerations. 

Spencer  lias  faced  the  question  his  philosophy  required 
him  to  face,  that  of  accounting  for  religion  by  natural  causes. 
To  fail  here  would  be  the  destruction  of  his  system.  But  to 
show  that  the  origin  of  religion  mai/  be  as  he  describes  it, 
does  not  furnish  proof  that  such  is  ij:s  origin.  The  theory 
of  religion  can  have  no  more  value  than  the  '  First  Princi- 
ples.' Again,  among  naturalistic  theories  of  religion  this 
must  be  considered  the  most  thorouo^h-o:oinor :  for  while 
fetichism  leaves  unanswered  the  question  how  men  came  to 
worship  a  fetich,  the  theory  of  ancestor-worship  [»rofesses  at 
least  to  e.\[)lain  how  belief  in  tlie  post  mortem  existence  of 
ancestors  came  to  be  entertained.  Omitting  all  reference  to 
criticisms  against  the  theory  and  against  the  philosophical 
system  of  which  it  is  part,  the  most  that  could  be  claimed 
for  it  would  be  that  it  presents  a  plausible  naturalistic  theory 
of  the  origin  of  religion,  as  opposed  to  the  supernaturalistic 
theory  of  Christianity. 

Special  Considerations. 

Spencer  has  failed,  however,  to  make  out  even  so  strong 
a  case  as  this. 

1.  To  prove  his  theory  he  should  have  showfi  \hi>X  when 

homage  was  paid  to  ancestors,  no  homage  was  paid 
to  the  gods.  But  the  V'edahs  seem  to  illustrate  the 
contrary  idea  (Sociology  306). 

2.  It  is  important  to   show   that  filial  piety  is  worship  or 

such  worship  as  is  paid  to  the  gods.  Spencer  talks 
very  loosely  in  regard  to  this. 


6 

3.  Because  the  savage  regards  God  as  his  father,  he  is  not 

therefore  worshipping  his  ancestors.  To  make  much 
of  the  case  of  Unkulunkulu  in  this  direction  would 
require  him  to  draw  a  similar  inference  form  our  use 
of  the  Lord's  Prayer. 

4.  The  attempt  to  sliow  how  idolatry,  animal  worship  and 

nature  worship  were  related  to  ancestor-worship  is  an 
illustration  of  very  far-fetched  reasoning.  Thus  :  fe- 
tich worship  from  identification  of  deceased  with 
portions  of  his  clothing:  idol  worship  from  the.  habit 
of  making  images  of  the  deceased ;  animal  worship 
from  the  frequenting  of  the  home  of  the  deceased 
by  certain  animals,  or  from  the  fact  that  the  deceased 
hatl  an  animal  name  ;  })lant-worshi[)  from  the  intoxi- 
cating liquors  produced  from  some  plants,  supposed 
in  this  way  to  be  possessed  by  supernatural  beings ; 
mountain  worship  and  worship  of  the  sea  from  the 
fact  that  their  ancestors  came  from  the  mountain  or 
over  the  sea — origin  in  this  sense  was  mistaken  for 
parentage. 

5.  The  most  ]»lausible  argument  in  support  of  Spencer's 

view  would  be  derived  from  Greek  and  Roman  my- 
thology. Mr.  Spencer  is  thoroughly  committed  to 
the  Euhemeristic  theory  of  nn'thology ;  but  he  has  to 
encounter  the  opposition  even  here  of  a  very  influ- 
ential sehool  of  mytliologists. 

6.  Mr.  Spencer  must  answer  more  fully  tlian  he  has  al- 

ready done,  the  allegation  that  ancestor-worship  is 
confined  to  the  inferior  races  and  that  no  Indo- 
European  or  Semitic  nation,  so  far  as  we  know,  seems 
to  have  made  a  religion  of  worship  of  the  dead.  Mr. 
Spencer  believes  that  the  "  divine  man  as  conceived 
"had  everywhere  for  antecedent  a  powerful  man  as 
perceircil  "  (Sociology,  438).  This  is  supported  by  say- 
ing that  the  Jews  worshipped  an  ancestor  in  Jeho- 
vah ;  and  this  simple  and  absurd  assertion  is  his  an- 
swer to  the  objection  just  quoted. 

1).      lIi:<:iiL. 

There  is  notliiiig  that  calls  for  special  remark  so  far  as 
the  theistic  problem  in  the  Hegelian  philosophy  is  concern- 
ed.    The  d-'vclopiiicnt  of  Theism   is   a   part  of  a  system  of 


development,  and  no  criticism  is  called  for  beyond  the  crit- 
icism of  the  system  itself,  which  is  obviously  out  of  place 
here.  IIci::elianism  is  the  idealistic  form  of  the  doctrine 
of  develo})ment.  It  is  the  anti^xxles  of  the  philosophy  of 
Compte,  yet  presenting  points  of  resemblance  to  it.  In 
the  one  case  the  problem  is  :  Given  atoms,  to  make  a  cos- 
mos; and  the  solution  is  offered  us  in  the  First  Principles 
of  Herbert  Spencer.  In  the  other  case  the  problem  is : 
Given  the  Idea^  to  explain  the  cosmos ;  and  for  answer  we 
are  told  of  a  process  of  successive  evolutions  ending  in  con- 
scious, thinking,  praying  num.  Monotheism  in  this  sys- 
tem, as  in  that  of  Compte  or  Spencer,  is  the  result  of  a  pro- 
cess which  lias  been  going  on  silently  through  millenniums. 

E.     Max  Muller. 

It  is  not  very  easy  to  determine  the  position  of  this 
author  in  religious  thought.  His  didactic  position  does  not 
quite  accord  with  that  which  his  polemic  would  suggest. 

1.  In  his  attack  on   the  Comptean  theory  of  religion  he 

has  conclusively  shown  that  fetichism  is  not  the 
})rimitive  religion. 

2.  In  his  Hil)bert  Lectures  he  avows  less  heartily  than 

in  an  earlier  work  his  belief  in  a  religious  instinct; 
indeed  he  practically  discards  the  idea. 

3.  The  Max  ^liiller  of  to-day  is  not  the  Max  Miiller  of 

Chips  from  a  German  Workshop,  (Transactions  of 
Victoria  Institute,  July  1881),  and  cannot  be  quot- 
ed as  the  advocate  of  primitive  Monotheism  or 
Henotheism.  For  while,  as  a  student  of  literature, 
he  tells  us  that  Vedic  Writings  show  that  belief  in 
one  God  (Henotheism)  antedated  Polytheism  :  as  a 
psychologist,  asking  what  religion  a  man  can  learn 
through  his  five  senses,  he  tells  us  that  whether 
Monotheism  be  or  be  not  the  primitive  religion  is  of 
no  consequence,  since,  before  man  had  reached  any 
belief  in  God,  he  "had  already  accomplished  half 
his  journey."  The  primitive  Monotheism  pointed 
to  in  the  Vedas  is  thus  made  of  no  avail  by  the  sug- 
gestion that  the  journey  of  progress  was  half  done 
before  men  came  to  the  idea  of  God.  Max  Miiller 
must  be  classed  among  the  evolutionists;  but  it  must 
be  noted  that  his  recent  conclusions  regarding  primi- 


tive  relit^ions  are  in  cc^nliict  with  the  testimony  of  the 
ancient  literature  of  India  which  he  has  brought  to 
the  attention  of  English  readers. 

F.       SCIIELLING. 

Schelling  held  that  i>riniitive  man  had  an  intuitive  or 
instinctive  knowledge  of  God  ;  but  that  his  Theism  was 
relative,  not  absolute.  From  this  original  relative  Mono- 
theism have  come  two  streams  of  tendency,  one  issuing  in 
Polytheism,  the  other  in  absolute  Monotheism. 

His  reasons  for  this  view  are  : 

1.  It  furnishes  a  natural  answer  to  the  question  how  men 

became  Polytheists.  Belief  in  one  God  did  not  ex- 
clude belief  in  a  i)lurality  of  gods. 

2.  Monotheism  absolute,  or  belief  in   only   one   God,  is 

said  to  be  a  generalization  derived  through  contact 
with  a  previously  existing  Monotheism  and  through 
protestinij:  aijainst  it. 

Second  Theory  :     Revelation. 

1.  Distinguish  between  revelation   and    tradition.      The 

question  is  not  how  we  came  to  believe  in  God,  but 
how  any  belief  in  God  originated.  Tradition  does 
not  originate  anything,  and  hence,  a  traditional  the- 
ory ot  the  origin  of  religion  is  absurd.  The  genesis 
of  a  belief  is  one  thing  and  the  perpetuation  of  a  be- 
lief another. 

2.  So  distinguish  between  the  correcting  and  the  conserv- 

ing influence  of  the  Bible  in  regard  to  Theism  and 
the  <^enesis  of  theistic  belief. 
Doubtless  our  i)ure  Theism  is  due  mainly  to  the  inspired 
Word,  and  we  believe  in  one  and  only  one  God,  be- 
cause we  have  a  revelation  from  God;  but  this  is  not 
the  question. 

3.  The  question  is  wliether  the  genesis  of  primitive  the- 

ism is  due  to  revelation. 
A.  Watson  holds  that  man  lirst  knew  God  "by  sensible 

converse  with   Him." 
Schelling  objects  to  this  view  with  great  force,  by  declar- 
ing;   that  this  would   imj)ly  "a  previous   Atheism   of  con- 
BciouHiiess."     Cocker  objects,  by   saying  that   if  man    had 


been  devoid  of  the  idea  of  (iod,  it  nexer  c-oiild  have  been 
taught  liiin.  (Christianity  and  (ireek  IMiilosophy,  ]>.  95. "^ 
But  Cocker  (h)es  not  distinj^uisli  sufficiently  between  ati  in- 
tutitive  knowledge  of  God  and  <i  priori  bebefs  tbat  lead  log- 
ically and  necessarily  to  the  theistic  inference.  Watson 
holds  that  the  suecessive  revelations  made  to  tlie  idiosen 
people  were  disseminated  by  means  ot  commercial  inter- 
course between  Jews  and  the  (ientile  world,  and  that  this 
accounts  for  the  similarities  of  belief  tonnd  among  so  many 
nations. 

B.  Gladstone  accounts  for  these  similarities  by  su[t[)osing 
that  prior  to  the  dispersion  ot  nations  there  was  a  revela- 
tion, comprehending  not  only  Monotheism,  but  even  the 
more  distinctive  doctrines  of  grace.  But  his  reasoning  is 
not  convincing. 

There  is  no  evidence  that  Theism  had  its  origin  in  Reve- 
lation, undei-standing  by  Revelation  what  the  writers  just 
referred  to  mean  by  it. 

Third  Theory  :     Inference. 

It  is  held  by  some,  in  opposition  to  the  doctrine  that  be- 
lief in  God  is  intuitional,  that  men  reach  Theism  through 
inference.  Thus  Dr.  McCosh  argues  forcibly  (Intuitions, 
377)  that  Theism  does  not  possess  the  character  ot  a  simple, 
original,  unresolvable  belief;  and  Dr.  Flint  aflirms  that 
belief  in  God  is  an  inference,  though,  as  he  admits,  an  uncon- 
scious inference.  He  illustrates  and  maintains  his  position 
with  great  aptness  and  force.     But  it  is  to  be  remarked  : 

1.  We  must  distinguish  between  the  vindication  of  a  be- 

lief and  its  genesis.  Because  we  can  give  reasons 
for  believing  in  God,  it  does  not  follow  that  we  be- 
lieve in  God  on  account  of  reasons. 

2.  Yet  it  is  not  to  be  denied  that  a  belief  that  can  be  de- 

fended by  reasons  may  be  reached  through  reasons  ; 
and  it  is  true  that  there  are  cases  where  men  have 
left  Polytheism  for  Theism  through  force  of  reason- 
ing. 

3.  There  is  force  in   the  frequent   remark  that  men  be- 

lieved God  before  they  reasoned  about  him ;  and  this 
force,  though  diminished,  is  not  destroyed  by  Dr. 
Flint's  statement  of  the  doctrine  of  unconscious  in- 
ference. 


10 

Fourth  Thbory:    Intuition. 

The  word  Intuition  here  is  used  in  a  broad  sense,  and 
opinions  that  diifer  widely,  and  are  in  some  cases  in  open 
conflict,  will  be  grouped  under  this  head.  Different  from 
one  another  as  they  may  be,  they  are  at  one  in  the  state- 
ment that  belief  in  God  does  not  owe  its  genesis  either  to 
objective  revelation  or  to  a  conscious  inference. 

(1.)  ScHELLiNQ  AND  CousiN. — Both,  though  in  difierent 
forms,  believed  that  we  have  an  immediate  knowledge  of 
God,  the  Absolute. 

See  on  this  Dr.  Hodge's  chapter,  "  Can  God  be  known  ?" 
and  Sir  Wm.  Hamilton's  "Discussions." 

(2.)  Jacobi  and  Schleiermacher.  —  To  have  attention 
turned  to  the  feelings,  as  an  offset  to  the  purely  ethical  sys- 
tems in  vogue,  was  of  great  advantage :  yet  it  was  a  mis- 
take to  call  the  sense  of  dependence,  God-consciousness. 
Mansel  makes  this  mistake.  (Limits  of  Religious  Thought, 
p.  115.) 

(3.)  Calderwood.— This  writer  says  that  belief  in  the  ex- 
istence of  one  infinite  God  is  a  necessary  belief  In  sup- 
porting this  he  affirms  the  inconclusiveness  of  all  arguments 
for  the  Divine  existence — an  unnecessary  and  unfortunate 
mode  of  argument,  since  it  stakes  the  validity  of  theistic 
belief  on  the  question  of  its  intuitive  character. 

(4.)  Hodge.  Dr.  Hodge  says  that  the  idea  of  God  is  in- 
nate. Yet  notice:  (a)  He  maintains  the  validity  of  theistic 
proof,  [b)  He  does  not  believe  that  we  have  an  innate  idea 
of  the  one  living  and  true  God.  (c)  He  means  that  men  had 
an  idea  of  God  before  any  act  of  conscious  inference.  His 
position  does  not  differ  materially  from  Dr.  Flint's. 

(5.)  Caird.  Thougli  arguing  against  the  intuitive  view 
in  its  .strict  sense,  Caird  must  be  included  under  this  head 
when  tiie  word  is  used  in  the  broad  sense  of  this  discussion. 
He  holds  that  it  is  "  necessary  for  the  mind  to  relate  itself  to 
God."  Belief  in  God  is  not  an  inference  taken  into  the 
soul  through  force  of  reasons.  It  is  a  belief,  rather,  that 
flows  by  tlie  influence  of  the  Divine  impulse  into  the  chan- 
nel of  the  soul's  a(.'tivities. 

Tiie.se  difll'rent  opinions  represent  several  senses  in  which 
the  word  intuition  is  used  in  theistic  discussions. 

1.  By  intuition  we  may  mean  an  immediate  knowledge 
of  God.  Claims  to  this  kind  of  knowledge  have 
been  sufHcientlv  refuted  bv  Sir  W.  Hamilton. 


11 

2.  By  intuition  may  be  meant  an  intuitive,  self-evident, 

and  necessary  judgment  or  belief.  That  belief  in 
God  is  not  of  this  kind,  Dr.  McCosh  and  Dr.  Flint 
have  shown. 

3.  Most  men  who  say  that  their  belief  in  God  is  intui- 

tive mean  only  that  we  have  a  constitutional  tenden- 
cy or  impulse  toward  belief  in  God.  This,  however, 
is  capable  of  being  represented  in  different  ways. 
What  is  the  explanation  of  this  impulse,  or  instinct, 
or  tendency  ? 

(a)  It  may  mean  no  more  than  the  rapid,  and  so  uncon- 

scious inference,  such  as  is  involved  in  the  recognition 
of  our  fellow  men.  This  is  Dr.  Flint's  and  substan- 
tially Dr.  Hodge's  view. 

(b)  The  idea  of  God  may  be  the  necessary  correlative  of 

the  idea  of  the  finite,  the  conditioned. — Cousin. 

(c)  With  some  the  idea  of  God  is  a  moment  in  a  process 

wherein  God  himself  is  coming  to  consciousness. 
Man's  thought  of  God  is  therefore  God's  thought  of 
himself — Hegel. — Caird. 

(d)  Again,  the  idea  of  God  may  be  God's  testimony  to  His 

own  existence.  Is  there  any  objection  to  this  view 
of  the  genesis  of  an  idea  of  God*?  We  live  and  move 
and  have  our  being  in  Him.  Are  there  not  good 
reasons  for  believing  that  it  is  through  the  Spirit  of 
God  within,  and  not  merely  by  arguments  without, 
that  we  derive  our  first  belief  in  God  ? 

This  view  would  have  these  advantages,  at  least : 

a.  Objective  theistic  proof  is  not  made  unnecessary  by 
tliis  explanation. 

j3.  The  theistic  belief,  not  originating  in  induction,  is  not 
conditioned  by  the  probability  of  inductive  proof. 

y.  This  view  accounts  for  all  forms  of  the  a  priori  argu- 
ment, and  justifies,  in  a  measure,  the  claims  that  are 
made  on  behalf  of  intuitional  Theism. 

0.  It  falls  in  with  the  analogy  of  subsequent  Revelation. 

e.  It  makes  it  unnecessary  to  establish  a  schism  between 
Adam  and  his  posterity,  as  to  the  mode  of  knowing 
God. 

^.  It  is  in  harmony  with  the  doctrine  of  God's  omnipres- 
ence to  believe  that  His  thought  is  so  far  ooufiuent 
with  ours,  that  we  know  Him  through  His  direct  re- 
lation to  the  soul. 


12 

III.  Discussion  of  Theism. 

Throe  divisions  : 

1.  The  ancient  period,  extending  to  the  8th  century  A. 

1).     Greek  and  Konian  philosophy. 

2.  The  niedia'val,  extending  to  the  15th  century.     Scho- 

lasticism. 

3.  The  modern. 

I.       FIRST    PERIOD. 

Greek  pliilosophy  falls  into  three  divisions:  The  Pre- 
Socratic;  the  Socratic-Aristotelian  ;  the  Post-Aristotelian. 

The  Pre-Socratic  period  exhibits  a  developing  process  of 
generalization.  There  is  little  Theism  in  it ;  but  it  is  less 
Pantheistic,  probably,  than  is  commonly  supposed. 

Assuming  that  the  generalizing  process  took  on  two 
forms  in  the  Ionic  School,  the  mechanical  and  the  dynamic, 
Anaximander  illustrates  the  latter.  Under  the  idea  of 
TO  djTeipuu,  he  construed  the  universe  in  a  pantheistic,  or  as 
Fortlage  puts  it,  a  cosmotheistic  sense. 

In  the  Eleatic  school,  the  leading  idea  was  the  One  ro  iu. 
As  in  tlie  Ionic  School,  the  effort  of  the  Eleatics  was,  to 
reacli  unity,  but  in  a  different  way.  Anaximander  con- 
ceived of  the  multiplicity  in  the  phenomenal  world  as  modes 
of  existing  matter :  he  was  cosmotheistic.  Parmenides, 
on  the  other  hand,  reached  unity  by  a  process  of  abstrac- 
tion, by  stripping  objects  of  their  predicates.  His  unity 
was  a  logical  unitv — tlie  hii2:hest  catei^^ory,  or  Beinor.  His 
system  was  a  Logo-theism.  Xenophanes  is  the  theist  of  the 
Eleatics.  lie  protests  against  Polytheism,  and  ridicules 
Anthro})omorphism.  His  Monotheism  has  been  called  Pan- 
theism, but,  probably,  on  insufficient  ground. 

The  Eleatics  give  us  the  earliest  form  of  the  ontological 
argument ;  and  they  open  the  important  discussion  of  the 
relation  of  tlie  One  to  the  many.  That  relation  may  be 
represented  as  that  of 

{a)  (ienus  and  Sjiecies:     Logo-theism. 

(6)  Substance  and  mode  :     Cosmo-theism. 


(6^  Substance  and  mode:     Cosmo-theism. 

(c)  Cause  and  effect :     Theism. 

In  tlie  second  period  of  Greek  philosoDhv 


period  of  Greek  }>hilo8ophy  we  find  Anax- 
agoras,  who  marks  an  advance  in  theistic  discussion. 

Anaxagoras  recognized  not  only  the  unity  of  the  world, 
but  also  its  order  and  adjustments*^;  and  these  he  accounted 


13 

for  by  affirnnnc;  the  existence  of  a  world-ordering  voDc.  He 
is  distinctly  coniprnnented  by  Aristotle  for  this  advance  in 
the  explanation  of  tlie  universe.  There  is  no  good  reason 
for  denying  to  Anaxagoras  the  distinction  of  being  the  fa- 
ther of  the  doctrine  of  Final  Causes ;  and  the  fact  that,  for 
the  most  part,  he  explains  plienoraena  in  a  mechanical  way, 
does  not  disprove  the  fact  that,  arguing  from  the  analogy 
of  his  own  intelligence,  he  referred  the  order  of  the  uni- 
verse also  to  Intelligence. 

The  Kleatic  and  the  Anaxagorean  doctrine  differed  thus  : 
The  Eleatic  atHrmed  the  existence  of  one,  necessary  -Being, 
the  ground  of  all  phenomena ;  Anaxagoras  conceived  of  the 
world,  not  as  an  existence  merely,  but  as  such  an  existence, 
and  suggested  a  voDc  as  its  explanation.  The  Eleatic  saw 
the  world  of  multitude  and  sought  the  unifying  }>rinciple  : 
the  Anaxagorean  saw  tlie  world  of  ada[»tation  and  sought 
the  organising  principle. 

Socrates  discussed  Theism  for  practical  ends;  and  Ikj  was 
the  first  among  the  Greeks,  says  Oesterley,  to  do  so.  Ilia 
was  not  the  Theism  of  speculation,  but  the  practical  The- 
ism, that  had  good  morals  as  its  motive.  Ilis  statement  of 
the  teleological  argument  is  to  be  found  in  the  Memorabilia, 
Bk.  1.,  Ca[».  4,  and  is  familiar. 

Plato  has  been  charged  with  Pantheism  ;  and  his  confused 
sense  respecting  Personality,  his  interchangeable  use  of  the 
words  God  and  Good,  and  his  want  of  nice  discrimination 
between  the  First  and  the  Final  Cause,  constitute  the  basis  of 
this  charge,  which  Prof  Jowett  saj's  is  untrue.  The  Theism 
of  Plato  embraces  the  following  points  : 

1.  But  for  prevalent  Atheism,  there  would  be  no  need  of 

proving  God's  existence. 

2.  The  soul  has  a  natural  tendency  to  believe  in  God. 

3.  The  orderly  movements  of  the  heavenly  bodies  sug- 

gested to  him  a  Divine  author  and  presence. 
The  distinction    now  made  between  order  and   ends  in 
nature  was  understood.      This   argument  (the    Cos- 
mological)  is  found  in  the  tenth  book  of  the  Laws. 

4.  But  in  the  Timaeus  he  argues  teleologically,  from  the 

adaptation  of  means  to  ends  in  our  bodily  organism. 

5.  The  a^tiological    argument,  pure  and   simple,  was  also 

recognized  ;  though  it  is  the  distinction  of  Aristotle 
to  have  developed  it. 


14 

6.  The  inconiniensurable  character  of  mind  and  matter 
leads  to  the  argument  for  a  universal  mind.  His 
view  approaches  the  doctrine  of  the  anima  miindi,  and 
this  may  be  the  basis  of  the  allegation  that  he  was  a 
pantheist.  But  the  doctrine  of  the  anima  mundi  is 
not  l*antheism. 

Aristotle  found  arguments  for  the  existence  of  God  in 
the  religious  consciousness  of  men,  and  in  the  order  of  the 
world.  His  great  argument,  howev^er,  and  the  one  most 
characteristic  of  his  philosophy,  is  found  in  his  doctrine  of 
a  First  Mover.  There  is,  he  says,  first  that  which  is  moved 
but  does  not  produce  motion  ;  secondly,  tliat  which  both 
moves  and  causes  motion ;  and,  thirdly,  that  which  is  un- 
moved and  produces  motion.  This  first  mover  is  incorpo- 
real, immovable,  without  parts  or  passions.  It  is  pure  en- 
ergy;  Absolute  Being;  God.  God  has  no  end  outside  of 
Himself  He  is  his  own  end.  God's  thought  does  not  find 
its  object  out  of  Himself  Thought  and  thinker  are  one. 
His  thought  is  the  thought  of  thought. 

Aristotle  has  given  us,  says  Zeller,  the  first  scientific 
foundation  for  Theism,  inasmuch  as  in  his  system  the  defi- 
nite thought  of  a  self-conscious  intelligence  in  God  is  not 
due  to  a  merely  religious  idea,  but  is  rigidly  deduced  from 
the  principles  of  his  philosophical  system. 

Yet,  as  Zeller  goes  on  to  shew,  it  is  difficult  to  say  what 
Aristotle  held,  regarding  the  relation  of  God  to  the  world; 
and  this  difficulty  has  led  some  to  say  that  his  Theism  was, 
in  realitv,  a  Pantheism,  that  is  to  sav,  was  not  Theism  at 
all. 

No  one  has  recognized  finality  in  nature  more  distinctly 
than  Aristotle.  He  was  as  cognizant  as  Paley  of  the  adap- 
tation of  means  to  ends.  But  finality  in  nature  does  not 
seem  to  shut  him  up  to  the  necessity  of  conceiving  God  as 
a  designer.  Nature,  he  says,  has  a  tendency  to  realize  the 
good.  God,  says  Aristotle,  moves  the  world  as  the  loved 
object  moves  the  one  loving.  And  this,  by  some,  is  con- 
strued to  mean  that  God  is  the  efficient  cause,  only  as  He  is 
the  final  cause.  This,  again,  is  capable  of  being  understood 
in  a  sense  that  destroys  the  distinction  between  God  and  the 
world  ;  that  is  to  say,  is  a  juircly  ]>antheistic  sense.  Is  God 
only  another  name  lor  the  order,  the  finality,  manifest  in 
the  world  ?     U  so,  the  Aristotelian   doctrine  is  pantheistic. 


15 

Or  does  the  order  and  iiiiality  exlii])ited  in  Nature  exist  as  a 
jyrius  in  the  thouizht  of  God?  This  woidd  he  theistic,  and 
this  seems  to  he  Aristotle's  idea,  for  he  says  "  the  world  has 
its  principle  in  God^and  this  j>rin('i})le  exists,  not  merely  as 
a  form  immanent  in  the  world,  like  the  order  in  an  army, 
hut  also  as  a  self-existent  suhstanee,  like  the  general  in  an 
army."  (Uebervveg,  I,  163.)  See,  also,  Sir  Alex.  Grant's 
Ethics  of  Aristotle,  Vol.  I.,  283. 

The  Ejncureans  found  their  proof  of  God's  existence  in 
the  universality  of  the  hclief.  This  was  not  the  argument 
e  consensu  ycnthim,  nor  was  it,  as  Cicero  su|)posed,  the 
doctrine  that  belief  in  God  is  innate.  The  7i()6):fj(l^c(:  of  the 
Epicureans  was  held  to  prove  God's  existence,  by  showing 
that  the  gods  universally  nuuiifested  themselves  to  men  by 
direct  contact  in  sleep.  The  Stoics,  with  their  doctrine  of 
the  aninia  mundi,  are  frequently  quoted  as  pantheists.  Yet 
notice  that  they  believed  in  the  separate  personality  and 
immortality  of  the  individual  soul,  as  well  as  in  an  intelli- 
gent, world  ordering  soul  of  the  world. 

The  conflicting  sentiments  of  the  Stoics,  Epicureans,  and 
philosophers  of  the  New  Academy,  were  brought  out  in 
Cicero's  JDe  Natura  Deorum,  the  one  work  on  Natural  The- 
ology that  antiquity  has  furnished  us.  After  the  time  of 
Cicero,  Greek  philosophy  was  affected  by  Oriental  influ- 
ences ;  but  though  it  became  more  Theosophical,  no  con- 
tribution to  theistic  discussion  seems  to  have  been  made. 
Among  the  church  fathers,  Clement  and  Origen  denied 
the  possibility  of  proving  the  existence  of  God,  and  placed 
this  belief  among  the  a  priori  elements  of  knowledge.  Ath- 
anasius  recognized  the  moral  argument  as  the  strongest. 
Augustine  argues  from  the  relatively  good,  great,  and  true 
to  the  absolutely  and  inflnitely  good,  great,  and  true.  His 
discussion  of  the  highest  truth  enters  largely  into  the  dis- 
cussions of  a  later  day.  Boethius,  (474  A.  I).),  in  his  De 
Consolatione  PliHosophiae^  enlarged  upon  the  same  idea.  He 
was  the  precursor  of  Anselm  in  this  field,  and  is  said  by 
Kostlin  (Stud.  u.  Krit.,  1875)  to  be  the  founder  of  onto- 
logical  theistic  proof. 

2.      SECOND    PERIOD. 

The  conditions  did  not  exist  in  the  ancient  world  for  the 
production  of  a  reasoned  Theism  and  of  elaborate  treatises 
in  Natural  Theology.     These  conditions  are. 


16 

1.  The  antithesis  between  Natural  and  Revealed  Religion, 

tiie  result  of  our  having  the  Bible. 

2.  The  existence  of  Dogmatic  Theology.     For  when  our 

knowledge   of    God    is    system^ized,  the    question 
whether  God  exists,  at  once  becomes  a  locus. 

3.  The  polemic  relations  of  Theism  to  anti-theistic  theo- 

ries. 

These  conditions  began  to  be  realized  in  the  Scholastic 
philosophy,  and  they  have  been  realized  increasingly  ever 
since.  The  theistic  discussions  of  Scholasticism  are,  for  the 
most  part,  a  repetition  of  the  arguments  found  in  Greek 
philosophy.  Aristotle's  argument  based  on  motion,  the 
argument  based  on  the  highest  good,  etc.,  etc. 

Two  books,  only,  come  to  us  from  Scholasticism,  devoted 
specially  to  Theism  :  Anschn's  Fros-logium  and  the  Theologia 
yaturalis,  of  Raymond  De  Sebonde. 

Scholasticism  falls  under  two  periods  :  John  Scotus  Eri- 
gena,  Roscellin,  Anselm,  and  Abelard  mark  the  first  period  ; 
Thomas  Aquinas,  Occam,  and  Duns  Scotus,  the  second. 
Phitonic  pliil()S()j>hy  was  dominant  in  the  first  period.  The 
Aristotelian  in  the  second.  Anselm  and  Aquinas,  respec- 
tively, rei)resented  these  periods.  Anselm  was  the  heir  of 
Augustine  and  Boethius;  as  the  former  had  argued  on  the 
basis  of  the  highest  Truth,  and  the  latter  on  the  basis  of 
the  relative  and  the  imperfect;  so  Anselm's  Theistic  proof 
in  the  Monologinm  proceeded  under  the  belief  of  the  highest 
(iood. 

Dissatisfied  with  the  Monologium,  Anselm  attempts  in 
the  Proshjgium  to  make  a  complete  demonstration  of  the 
existence  of  God.  The  key  to  the  argument  is  found  in  a 
phrase  which  he  uses  in  the  beautiful  prayer  with  which 
the  treatise  begins  :  Thou  art  that  <hlo  nihil  majus  cogitari 
possit. 

1.  Anselm's  statement  and  Gaunilo's  reply. 

We  i)elieve  that  God  is  that  than  which  a  greater  cannot 
be  conceived.  I^ut  that  which  exists  in  re  is  greater  than 
that  which  exists  in  intdlectu.  Therefore  when  we  say  that 
we  believe  in  a  l)eing  than  whom  a  greater  cannot  be  con- 
ceived, we  must  think  of  a  Ik'ing  existing  in  re.  For  if  God 
did  U(it  exist  in  ri\  we  could  think  of  him  as  existing  in  re, 
and  this  wouM  be  greater.  I>ut  we  are  thinking  of  a  being 
than  which  a  greater  cannot  be  conceived.  Again,  God 
cannot  be  thought  !iot  to  be.     For  if  the  Being  of  whom  we 


17 

think  can  be  thought  not  to  be,  we  can  think  of  a  Being 
who  cannot  be  thought  not  to  be,  and  this  would  be  greater. 
But  we  are  thinking  of  a  Being  than  wl)oni  a  greater  can- 
not be  conceived.  (Jaunilo  replies  ])y  saying,  substantially, 
that  what  exists  subjectively  does  not  necessarily  exist  objec- 
tively. Between  the  greatest  Being  f/ioiff/lif  as  existing  and 
the  greatest  Being '^r/<^^f/(y  existing,  there  is  a  wide  diti'erence. 
Then  follows  his  famous  illustration  of  the  island. 

Ansehn  replies  by  saying  that  his  argument  is  unique  ; 
that  it  a{)plies  only  to  the  Being,  quo  majns  iio/i  cogitari  pos^ 
sit ;  that  if  (launilo  could  find  anything  to  which  his  rea- 
soning would  apply  except  this  being  quo  uiujus,  etc.,  he 
would  make  him  a  present  of  tlie  lost  island. 

2.  Criticisms  of  the  Anselmian  proof.  See  Runze  :  Brr 
Ontoloc/ische  Goitcsbeweis. 

(a)  AsswuptioKS.  Fortlage,  Hasse,  and  others  say  the 
whole  discussion  depends  on  the  Realism  that  underlies  it. 
Others  say  that  Anselm  first  gets  his  idea  of  God  from 
Revelation,  and  then  seeks  to  legitimate  it  by  reasoning. 
Then  again  it  is  said  that  his  argument  is  an  attempt  to  give 
dialectical  certitude  to  an  idea  derived  through  the  witness 
of  the  Holy  Ghost. 

(/>)  The  aim  of  the  Anselmian  proof  has  been  criticised. 
Schelling  says  that  Anselm  tried  to  prove  God's  existence  as 
if  God  were  an  individual  to  be  coi^rdinated  with  other 
individuals,  whereas  He  is  the  ground  of  all  Being.  But 
Anselm  is  not  open  to  the  charge  of  holding  a  merely  me- 
chanical Theism. 

As  little  force  is  there  in  the  objection  that  we  cannot 
prove  God's  existence  a  priori  and  deductively,  because  God, 
being  the  suruymnn  genus,  cannot  be  included  in  a  higher 
genus. 

(c)  Objections  based  on  the  method  of  Anselm.  It  was 
a  mistake  to  seek  to  prove  God's  existence  by  syllogistic 
process.  God,  says  Fischer,  is  metalogical.  Great  unan- 
imity of  thinkers  on  this  point.  In  fact,  however  sure  we 
are  of  God's  existence,  when  we  try  to  prove  it,  we  only 
transfer,  it  is  said,  the  assumption  from  the  conclusion  to 
the  premises. 

But  there  is  no  corresponding  unanimity  in  regard  to  the 
particular  fallacy  in  the  reasoning  of  Anselm.  Identity  of 
premises,  circle,  petitio  principH,  four  terms,  not  to  speak  of 
other  iallacies,  have  all  been  laid  to  his  charge. 


18 

(</)  Viliiiar  denounces  the  Anselraian  proof  in  the  inter- 
ests of  revealed  truth,  as  the  "  most  glaring  illusions  of  a 
most  vicious  pride."  This,  if  valid  against  Anselm,  is  valid 
against  all  reasoned  Theism. 

3.   Remarks  on  the  Anselmian  proof 

Anselm  may  be  considered  as  reasoning  from  any  of  these 
premises : 

(a)  What  exists  in  inteUcclu  exists  in  re.  A  Being  ([uo 
majtis^  etc. 

This  would  justify  Gaunilo's  objection.  But  this  is  not 
Anselm. 

[h)  What  is  necessarily  in  intellectu  exists  in  re.  A  Being 
quo  /najas,  etc. 

This  would  make  superfluous  the  statement  that  to  exist 
(/(  re  is  greater  than  to  exist  in  intellectu.  Again,  this  is  not 
Anselm. 

(<?)  What  is  necessarily  thought  to  exist  in  re,  does  exist 
in  re.  But  a  Being  q?/o  rnojus,  etc.  Therefore,  etc. 
This  is  the  Anselmian  position ;  and  the  minor 
premise  clearly  needs  proof.  Anselm  tries  to  prove 
it.  His  argument  is  the  one  attempt  in  history  to 
give  dialectical  objectivity  to  an  idea  of  the  Infinite. 
Hence  the  attention  it  has  attracted.  The  nerve  of  the 
argument  is  in  the  statement,  "  What  exists  in  re  is 
greater  than  what  exists  in  intellectu ;  "  and  since  we 
are  necessarily  led  to  think  of  a  Being  than  which  a 
greater  cannot  be  conceived,  we  are  supposed  to  be 
necessarily  led  to  think  of  such  a  Being  as  existing 
in  re. 

To  which  it  may  be  replied  : 

1.  Tliat  the  predicate  existence  adds  nothing  to  the  con- 
cept ;  and  so  it  may  be  denied  that  a  thing  in  re  is 
greater  than  a  thing  in  intellectu. 

1.  That  if  a  thing  ///  re  were  greater,  then  the  conclusion 
would  be  either  that  a  Being  in  re  existed  in  intellectu, 
wliich  is  absurd  ;  or  that  the  Being  it}  intellectu  was 
not  a  Being  quo  mrijus,  etc.;  since  it  was  not  as  great 
as  the  Being  in  re. 

Aquinas  devotes  two  pages  in  his  Su/nma  {quuestio  2)  to 
the  existence  of  God  and  adduces  five  arguments  : 

1.  From  motion.  It  is  Aristotle's  agument  for  a  first 
mover,  and  really  means  that  a  first  cause  which  is 
not  a  physical  cause,  is  the  only  true  cause. 


19 

2.  Tlie  ari^uiiient  based  on  the  efficient  cause — an  iiii}>licit 

statcnit'iit  of  the  aeti()]()<;ical  ar«^unioiit, 

3.  TliL*  ar^mnoiit  (.r  possi/tili  <f  iicccssdrlo.     There  muHt  be 

some  necessary  lU'ini::,  l»avin<i:   its   cause  of  existence 
in  itself,  and  tlieretore  eternal. 

4.  The    art^unient   ex    gradibus   qui   in    rebus    invcniuntur. 

\'irtually,  AuG^ustine's  ari^unient   as   to  the   hii^liest 
truth. 

5.  The  ari^unient  c.r  (jnhiriKitionc  nruin. :  a  compact  state- 

ment of  the  teleological  Jirgument. 
The  last  of  the  Schoolmen  who  deserve  notice  liere  is 
Raymond  de  8ebonde,  (1384  A.D.,  about),  whose  epoch- 
niakin<yc  book  was  tlie  first  Bystematic  treatise  on  Natural 
Theoloi^y.  Raymond's  book  is  an  unsuccessful  attempt  to 
prove  from  nature  the  doctrines  of  revealed  religion.  He 
affirms  that  God  has  given  us  two  revelations:  crcalura  and 
Scriptimt.  His  book  is  entitled  Liber  0)ratf/rorum.  Best 
account  of  his  system  given  by  Matzke. 

3.       THIRD    PERIOD. 

The  publication  of  Descartes'  (liscourse  on  Method,  in 
1639,  marks  the  transition  to  the  modern  period  in  theistic 
discussion.  (.)f  liis  Theism  there  should  be  no  doubt,  for 
he  says  :  "  By  the  name  ot  God  I  mean  an  infinite,  eternal, 
immutable,  independent,  omniscient,  omnipotent  substance 
by  which  I  and  all  other  things  which  are,  if  it  be  true  that 
these  things  e.xist,  have  been  created.'"  Dr.  Kunze,  in 
his  recent  history  of  the  ontological  proofs,  complains  that 
his  Theism  is  too  Deistic,  in  this  respect  contrasting  with 
Anselm.  Saisset,  on  tlie  other  hand,  in  his  Modern  Pan- 
theism, begins  with  Descartes.  His  criticisms  are  acute. 
But  Descartes'  doctrine  of  continuous  creation,  together 
with  his  determinism,  do  not  suflfice  to  i)rove  the  charge  of 
Pantheism.  Mahaff'v  idso  i^^ives  ])robablv  too  much  weii2:ht 
to  a  casual  remark  of  Descartes,  that  "  the  Deity  might  be 
identified  with  tlie  order  of  Nature." 

Before  noticing  the  Cartesian  argument,  consider  this 
remarkable  statement :  "  I  very  clearly  see  that  the  certitude 
and  truth  of  all  science  depends  on  the  knowledge  alone  of 
the  true  God,  insomuch  that  before  I  knew  Ilini,  I  could 
have  no  j)erfect  knowledge  of  any  other  thing."  His  argu- 
ment is,  that  unless  I  know  God  I  know  nothing;  since,  if 


20 

there  be  no  God,  how  do  I  know  that  my  senses  do  not 
deceive  me.  This  is  substantially  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  argu- 
ment for  the  veracity  of  consciousness.  But  is  this  not 
reasoning  in  a  circle?  If  I  must  know  God  before  lean 
know  anything,  how  can  I  ever  know  God  ?  Confidence  in 
our  knowing  powers  must  condition  confidence  in  our 
knowledge  of  God. 

Deseartes  did  not  fall  into  such  a  palitablc  tallacy.  Rightly 
or  wrongly,  Descartes  was  as  sure  of  God's  existence,  as  of 
tlie  truths  of  geometry.  But  it  is  conceivable,  he  says,  that 
he  is  ii:;[K)scd  u])on  in  the  ver}'  constitution  of  his  nature. 
That  18,  he  sees  that  the  reasonings  in  geometry  are  true,  on 
the  supposition  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  truth,  and  that 
this  postulate  conditions  them.  Is  not  this  Cartesian  posi- 
tion our  own  position  in  the  debate  of  to-day  ?  The  theistic 
liypothesis  is  the  only  guarantee,  in  other  words,  of  our  intel- 
lectual integrity.  We  can  cast  discredit  upon  all  processes 
of  thinking,  by  a  theory  of  knowledge  that  destroys  the 
possil)ility  of  knowledge;  or  we  can  make  belief  in  God  the 
presup])osition  and  postulate  of  all  knowledge.  This  is  not 
reasoning  in  a  circle. 

Descartes  made  use  of  three  arguments  for  the  existence 
of  God. 

1.  From  the  idea  of  a  Perfect  Being.  lie  sought  to  show 
that  existence  was  implied  in  the  idea  of  a  Perfect  Being. 
*'  I  found  that  tlie  existence  of  the  Being  was  comprised  in 
the  idea,  in  the  same  way  that  the  equality  of  its  three  angles 
to  two  right  angles  is  comprised  in  the  idea  of  a  triangle." 
This  argument  is  not  as  acute  as  Anselnrs,  and  is  equally 
open  to  criticism. 

2.  From  the  causal  judgment  in  accounting  for  his  own 
existence.     This  is  exhibited  under  several  forms. 

{(i)  My  continued  existence  from  moment  to  moment  re- 
quires a  cause  as  much  as  my  beginning  to  exist 

(h)  The  cause  of  my  beginning  to  exist  is  either  self  ex- 
istent, or  is  also  a  caused  existence,  and  so  back  in 
the  regress  of  causes  till  we  come  to  a  first  cause. 

(c)  But,  really,  my  parents  are  not  the  cause  of  my  ex- 
istence:  i.  e.,  of  my  mind.  "  It  does  not  follow  that 
I  am  conserved  by  them,  or  even  that  I  was  produced 
by  them,  in  so  far  as  I  am  a  thinking  being."  Cre- 
ati(jMism,  in  other  words,  is,  according  to  Descartes, 
the  only  rational  explanation  of  the  origin  of  the  soul. 


21 

3.  From  the  ciiusal  judgment,  as  accounting  for  the  idea 
of  God  in  man.  It  was  impossihle,  he  said,  that  the  idea  of 
a  Perfect  Being  shoukl  originate  with  himself,  an  imperfect 
being;  and  "  it  but  remained  that  it  had  been  placed  in  me 
by  11  nature  which  was,  in  reality,  more  perfect  than  mine, 
and  which  possessed  within  itself  all  the  perfections  of  which 
I  could  form  any  idea :  that  is  to  say,  in  a  single  word, 
which  was  God.''     (Method  77). 

With  the  exception  of  the  first,  which  is  the  ontological, 
or  Anselmian  argument,  the  Cartesian  proofs  are  a  posteri- 
ori, the  second  being  the  application  of  the  causal  judgment 
to  the  author's  own  contingent  existence ;  and  the  third, 
which  contains  the  distinctive  feature  of  Cartesian  Theism, 
afhrms  that  the  existence  of  God  will  alone  explain  belief  in 
God. 

Ivuno  Fischer  (I,  307)  represents  the  Cartesian  proofs  as 
proceeding  according  to  the  following  stages  :  (1)  The  idea 
of  a  Perfect  Being ;  this  not  significant  unless  necessary  : 
(2)  the  idea  necessary;  even  this  no  guarantee  of  objective 
reality  :  (3)  the  idea  the  product  of  the  Perfect  Being,  for 
the  imperfect  being  could  not  have  originated  it.  There 
is,  therefore,  a  God,  for  the  idea  of  God  is  the  revelation  of 
TTimsclf. 

The  ontological  and  the  "  anthropological "  proof,  as 
Fischer  calls  it,  go  hand  in  hand.  The  union  ot  the  two 
makes  the  difterence  between  the  Anselmian  and  the  Car- 
tesian proof.  There  is,  doubtless,  great  force  in  this  com- 
bination ;  but,  as  Kostlin  says,  the  combination  is  Fischer's 
not  Descartes'.  Xote,  also,  that  Descartes  held  that  the  belief 
in  God  is  an  *  innate  idea,'  notwithstanding  his  statement 
that  it  is  an  effect,  the  cause  of  which  is  God.  Compare 
this  with  what  is  said  above  on  the  genesis  of-  the  idea  of 
God :     Intuition. 

Pantheist  as  he  is,  Spinoza  is  usually  cited  by  the  histo- 
rians of  Theism.  Indeed,  Schwegler  regards  his  doctrine  as 
the  "  most  abstract  Theism."  This  is  wrong.  Spinoza  will 
be  discussed  later,  under  Antithcism.  Notice  the  common 
ground  between  Theism  and  Pantheism,  as  illustrated  in 
Spinoza's  proof  of  God's  existence.  Both  use  arguments 
based  on  cause ;  both,  the  principle  ex  nihilo,  etc.  Both 
affirm  the  necessity  of  a  ground  of  all  being.  To  both  the 
contingency  of  the  phenomenal  and  the  individual  are  ap- 
parent.    The  difference,  primarily,  respects  the   relation  of 


the  One  and  the  Many ;  and,  secondarily,  the  predicates 
which  are  to  be  affixed  to  the  One  (See  below,  Samuel 
Clarke).  Malebranchc  should  be  mentioned  here,  with  the 
query  whether  lie  should  be  regarded  as  a  theist  or  panthe- 
ist. *Bowen  stands  bv  him  as  not  being  a  pantheist.  (Mod. 
Philosophy,  84). 

Leibnitz,  with  his  doctrine  of  monads  and  of  pre-estab- 
lished harmony,  was  led  naturally  to  consider  the  teleolog- 
ical  facts  of  the  world.  Finality  is  necessarily  part  of  his 
system.  Oidy  two  views  were  possible.  His  thought  might 
terminate  on  the  order ^  calling  it  God ;  or  he  might  seek  a 
cause  of  this  order,  and  so  be  a  theist :  and  a  theist  we 
believe  him  to  have  been.  The  Cartesian  proof  was  char- 
acterized as  an  "  imperfect  demonstration,'"  and  Leibnitz 
said  that  Descartes  ought  lirst  to  have  proved  the  2^ossibitity 
of  God's  existence.  lie  was  the  originator  of  the  once  com- 
mon method  of  arguing  the  fact  of  God's  existence  from  the 
possibility  of  His  existence. 

Locke  is  the  author  of  a  theistic  argument,  based  on  the 
existence  of  the  hunum  mind,  which  "  Physicus  "  makes  the 
subject  of  elaborate  criticism.  Briefly  stated  it  is:  (ci)  Since 
something  is,  something  must  always  have  been  ;  (6)  And 
there  has  been  a  knowing  being  from  all  eternity,  or  else 
there  was  a  time  when  there  was  no  knowledge;  {c)  If  there 
was  a  time  when  tliere  was  no  knowing  being,  it  is  impossi- 
ble that  any  knowing  being  ever  could  have  been.  That  is 
to  say,  oidy  mind  can  be  the  cause  of  mind. 

Locke's  argument  deserves  consideration.  It  presents  to 
us  a  choice  of  hy])othe8es.  Either  God  the  jmas  and  pos- 
tulate of  all  intelligence  exists  ;  or  else  there  was  a  time 
when  there  was  no  knowing  being  in  the  universe.  And 
though  the  advocate  of  evolution  would  not  say  that  it  is  as 
impossible  for  mind  to  be  the  product  of  matter  as  for  the 
three  angles  of  a  triangle  not  to  be  equal  to  two  right  angles, 
yet  he  must  choose  between  an  Infinite  Intelligence  and 
some  nuiximum  finite  intelligence.  (See  Kirknian.  Phil- 
OHophy  y:ifh()iU  Assaniptions.)  How  knowledge  could  ever 
have  arisen  had  there  not  been  an  eternally  existing  know- 
ing being,  is  a  question  that  has  not  been  answered  since 
Locke's  day;  and,  slightly  changing  the  form  of  Locke's 
alternatives,  may  we  not  say  tliat^his  argument  still  presents 
to  us  the  choice  between  Theism  and  "the  most  thorough- 
paced Agnosticism? 


23 

Schwegler  represents  Samuel  Clarke  as  ItolongiDi;  to  the 
Sehool  of  John  Loeke,  hut  seareely  on  suilicient  grounds. 
(8ee  Encye.  J^rit.)  Clarke's  argument  is  often  represented 
as  ontological,  hut  it  is  hardly  that,  ft  is  a  comhination  of 
a  pn'oii  iun\  a  posteriori  arguments.  The  steps  in  the  argu- 
ment are  these: 

(rt)  Something  has  existed  trom  etei-nity. 

(b)  That  something  is  immutahle  and  independent. 

(c)  Existing   without  external   eause   of  its   existenee,  it 

must  be  self-existent ;  /.  t.,  necessarily  existent. 

(d)  What  its  substance  is  we  do  not  know  ;  but  some  of 

its  attributes  are  demonstral)le. 

(e)  The   self-existent    must    be  infinite,  must  be   eternal, 

must  be  one,  etc. 

So  far  Spinoza  would  have  made  no  objection.  The 
problem  of  Theism  is  to  invest  the  One  with  intelligence 
and  free  will.  Clarke  admits  the  difficulty  of  doing  this  by 
a  priori  arguments,  though  it  is  easily  done  by  a  posteriori 
reasoning.  lie  uses,  therefore,  the  ordinary  aetiological 
argument,  employs  Aristotle's  argument  from  niotion,  and 
aflirms  the  impossibility  of  matter  producing  mind.  Clarke's 
argument  is  strong  one.  Xot  new,  but  a  new  synthesis  of 
old  arguments,  and  deservedly  holds  classical  rank  in  theistic 
literature. 

Kant's  criticism  of  theistic  proofs  marks  an  era  in  the 
literature  of  this  subject,  because  it  was  the  first  attempt  to 
state  and  classity  all  possible  arguments  for  God's  existence; 
because  it  is  the  most  thorough  criticism  of  these  proofs  to 
be  found  anywhere;  and  because  of  the  effect  produced  by 
it — some,  as  a  consequence,  falling  back  on  authority,  others 
on  intuition. 

The  criticism  embraces  these  points : 

1.  That  there  can  be  but  three  arguments  open  to  the 
speculative  reason,  in  [)roof  of  God's  existence:  the  onto- 
logical, the  cosmological,  and  the  physico-theological. 

2.  That  each  argument,  in  turn,  is  open  to  criticisms  that 
are  fatal  to  its  claim  to  be  a  proof  of  God's  existence. 

3.  That  the  cosmological  and  teleological  are  ultimately 
resolvable  into  the  ontological;  so  that,  strictly  st)eaking, 
all  speculative  proof  is  the  proof  commonly  known  as  the 
Anselmian,  or  Cartesian. 

The  only  points  that  concern  us  are  (2)  and  (3). 


24 

Kant  criticises  the  several  proofs  in  succession.  His  objec- 
tions to  the  ontological  argument  are,  in  the  main,  those 
already  referred  to.     (See  Anselm.) 

[a)  The  illustrations  of  correspondence  between  subjec- 
tive and  objective,  have  been  drawn  from  judgments, 
not  from    Tilings.     Thus,  in  that  of  the  triangle,  the 
proposition  is  not  that  the  triangle  exists,  but  that 
if  it  exist,  its  three  angles,  etc.     So  of  the  perfect 
Being. 
(6)  It  is  absurd  to  introduce  into  the  conception  of  a  thing 
cogitated    solely  in    reference  to  its   possibility,  the 
conception  of  its  existence.     This  he  shows  by  asking 
whether  the  proposition,  this  thing  exists,  is  analytic 
or  synthetic.     If  it  is  analytic,  we  must  either  iden- 
tify our  thought  and  the  thing,  or  else  we  must  as- 
sume that  the  thing  exists,  so  making  it  a  predicate 
which  is  repeated  in  the  proposition.     If,  however, 
it  is  synthetic,  there  is  no  contradiction  in  removing 
the  predicate.     But  the  ontological   argument  pro- 
ceeds on  the  assumption  that  the  proposition  is  ana- 
lytical, 
(c)  Kant  says,  also,  that  existence  is  not  a  real  predicate — 
distinguishing  between  a  logical  and  a  real  predicate. 
A    real    predicate    adds   something  to   the    concept. 
p]xistence  does  not  do  this.     If  existence  were  a  real 
predicate,  there  never  could  be  a  correspondence  be- 
tween the  concept  and  its  object,   since  the  object 
would  always  be  greater  than  the  concept. 
Kant's  objections  against  the  ontological  argument  are 
valid,  so  long  as  dialectical  objectivity  is  sought  by  means 
of  it.     But   Kant  does  not  set  aside  the  argument  found  in 
the  irresistible  tendency  of  the  mind  to  think  of  an  Infinite 
Being,  of  which   the  ontological  argument  is  only  a  syllo- 
gistic expression.     Kant's  "  dollars"  and  Gaunilo's  "island" 
are,  so   far  as  this  is  concerned,  hardly  analogous  to  this 
necessary  idea  of  the  Infinite. 

The  co.sniological  argument  is  characterized  by  Kant,  as 
containing  a  "  perfect  nest  of  dialectical  assumptions." 

Among  these  dialectical  assumptions  are  to  be  found  the 
following:  (1)  Tliat  the  doctrine  of  cause  and  efi^ect  trans- 
cends experience.  (2)  That  an  infinite  regress  of  finite 
causes  is  impossible,  etc. 


26 

But  the  strongest  objectiou  to  the  cosmological  argument 
is  that  it  is  idontical  witl)  tlie  outological  and  tlieretbre  falls 
under  the  same  condemnation. 

The  objections  to  the  teleoloi^ical  argument  are  not  for- 
midable, and  may  all  be  conceded  without  destroying  the 
value  of  the  argument  which  Kant  describes  as  **  the 
oldest,  the  clearest,  and  the  most  in  conformity  with  the 
common  reason  of  humanity."  Reserving  the  right  to 
criticise  the  argument  on  the  ground  that  it  proceeds  on  a 
basis  of  analogical  reasoning,  he  calls  attention  to  the  fol- 
lowing points : 

1.  The  order  and  harmony  of  the  world  evidence  the  con- 
tingency of  itQ  form,  not  of  its  matter.  It  is  impossible  there- 
fore to  deduce  a  creator  of  matter;  the  most  we  can  get  is 
an  arranger  of  matter — an  architect. 

2.  From  the  order  and  harmony  of  the  universe  we  may 
infer  the  existence  of  a  cause  proportionate  thereto.  That 
is  to  say  :  we  cannot  infer  from  the  order  of  the  universe 
that  the  cause  of  that  order  is  infinite.  To  this  it  is  neces- 
sary to  rei)ly  that  every  theistic  argument  is  not  intended  to 
prove  the  whole  theistic  position,  and  that  the  infinity 
of  God  can  be  reached  through  otiier  arguments  than  the 
teleological. 

The  least  noticed,  but  most  subtle  form  of  the  Kantian 
criticism  of  the  theistic  proofs  is  that  in  which  he  attempts 
to  reduce  them  all  to  the  ontclogical.  In  making  this 
attempt  he  not  only  fails,  but  betrays  inconsistency.  For 
after  speaking  of  "that  unfortunate  ontological  argument" 
in  most  disparaging  terms,  he  identifies  with  it  the  teleol- 
ogical argument  which  he  had  spoken  of  as  one  that  "  always 
deserves  to  be  mentioned  with  respect."  But  it  is  difficult 
to  see  how  Kant  establishes  the  identity  of  these  three  forms 
of  argument. 

The  physico-theological  argument,  he  admits,  entitles  us 
to  infer  a  cause  proportwiiatcto  the  "  order  and  design  visible 
in  the  universe."  But  he  says,  this  cause  must  be  regarded 
as  the  conception  of  an  all-sufficient  being.  But  an  all- 
sufficient  being  we  cannot  infer  from  the  order  and  design 
visible  to  us,  /.  e.  from  experience.  And  so  after  admiring 
the  wisdom  and  other  attributes  of  the  author  of  the  world's 
order,  we  leave  the  ground  of  empiricism  and  infer  the  con- 
tingency of  the  world  from  the  order  that  is  observable  in  it. 
From  this  contingency,  and  by  the  help  of  transcendental 


26 

conceptions  alone,  we  infer  the  existence  of  something 
absolutely  necessary,  and  "  still  advancing,  proceed  from  the 
absolute  necessity  of  the  first  cause  to  the  completely  de- 
termined or  determining  conception  thereof,  the  conception 
of  an  all-eml»racing  reality." 

Tiiis  is  Kant's  account  of  the  way  in  which  the  "  physico- 
theological,  failing  in  its  undertaking  recurs  in  its  embar- 
rassment to  the  cosmological  argument." 

But  observe :  these  three  arguments  may  supplement 
each  other,  and  may  severally  contribute  to  the  support  of 
the  theistic  position  without  being  identical.  Kant's  argu- 
ment only  goes  to  show  that  they  are  mutually  auxiliary. 
He  fails  to  make  out  the  identity  of  the  physico-theological 
and  the  cosmological  proof. 

For,  if  the  order  and  iinality  of  the  universe  demand  as  a 
cause  proportionate  thereto  an  all-sufficient  being,  the 
physico-theological  argument  by  this  ver}^  concession  must 
be  held  as  offering  a  fair  proof  of  the  existence  of  such  a 
being.  In  that  case  it  is  clearly  under  no  obligation  to  the 
cosmological  argument.  If,  on  the  other  liand,  as  Kant 
would  seem  at  first  to  imply,  the  order  and  iinality  of  the 
world  demand  a  cause  only  proportinate  thereto  ;  if  that  is 
to  say,  they  do  not  necessarily  demand  an  infinite  or  all- 
sufficient  cause :  then  it  is  not  an  objection  against  the 
])liysico- theological  proof  that  it  will  not  justify  us  in  in- 
ferring an  all-sufficient  cause;  and  again,  it  is  not  under 
obligation  to,  and  still  less  is  it  identical  with  the  cos- 
mological argument. 

Kant  fails  equally  in  the  attempt  to  identify  the  cosmo- 
logical and  ontological  proofs.  The  cosmological  argument 
proceeding  empirically,  infers  the  existence  of  a  necessary 
being.  l>ut  it  gives  no  information  concerning  the  nature 
of  that  being.  It  leaves  experience  in  order  to  seek  a  con- 
ception adequate  to  that  of  a  necessary  being,  and  finds  it  in 
the  ens  reaUsa'unum. 

If  now  Kant  had  said  there  is  an  a  priori  as  well  as  an 
a  yosUriori  element  in  the  cosmological  argument,  no  ob- 
jection could  be  made.  But  he  says  that  in  identifying  the 
eiis  rcallssiinnin  with  the  necessary  being,  we  are  returning 
to  the  ontological  argument.  For,  he  continues,  when  we 
Bay  that  the  conception  of  ens  realissimum  is  adequate  to  the 
conception  of  a  necessary  being,  we  assume  that  we  can 
infer  the  latter  from  the  former.     The  argument  which  pro- 


27 

fosses  to  be  cosmological  and  to  proceed  from  ex})erieiice  is 
thus  covertly  ontoloi^ical  (Criti<[ue,  Mt'iklcjoliir.s  trann,  p. 
378). 

But  tliis  is  not  the  case.  The  conception  of  an  c/is  real- 
issimum  is  that  of  a  being  necessarily  existing.  But  that 
is  no  proot  that  the  necessary  being  exists  and  the  cosmo- 
logical  argument  does  not  proceed  upon  that  assumption. 
The  most  that  can  be  said  is  tliat  the  ontological  argument 
gives  us  the  conception  of  an  ms  re<d(ssmnm  as  of  a  l)cing 
necessarily  existing,  ))ut  is  impotent  so  far  as  proving  tlie 
existence  of  that  being  is  concerned ;  that  the  cosmological 
argument  proves  the  existence  of  a  necessary  being  but  that 
it  cannot  give  any  determinate  conception  of  that  being; 
and  that  the  two  arguments  unite  in  the  theistic  proof. 
Closely  related  they  undoubtedly  are,  but  identical  they 
are  not. 

In  other  words :  A  priori  we  know  that  if  a  necessary 
being  exists  it  must  be  ms  realissimum  ;  but  from  the  idea 
of  ens  realissimum  and  its  corresponding  conception  of  ne- 
necessarp  existence,  we  cannot  pass  to  the  objective  reality. 
A  posteriori^  however,  we  are  led  to  infer  the  existence  of  a 
necessary  being. 


THEISM. 


VWIT  II.     CONSTRUCTIVE. 

The  two  questions  to  l»e  dealt  with  in  this  division  of  our 
subject  are(l)  the  existeiiee  of  Cod  and  (2j  the  relation  oi' 
iiod  to  the  woi-ld. 

I.       TlIK    KXISTENCE    OF    (iOD. 

Notice  the  pioper  ai'LT'inientative  attitude  in  reference  t(» 
theistic  proof. 

1.  In  ^ivini::  a  reasone(l  account  of  tlieistic  belief  we  do 
not  prejudge  the  (piestion  as  to  its  icenesis.  Tlie  (piestion 
is  :  Given  an  antecedent  ])elief  in  Cod,  (hie  to  whatever 
cause,  whether  that  belief"  can  ])e  corroborated  by  argument. 

2.  We  (U)  not  undertake  to  demonstrate  the  existence  of 
God.  Physicus  says  that  theism  is  not  rationally  probable. 
AVe  affirm  that  it  is.  We  maintain  that  theism  can  be 
rationally  justiiied  and  that  atheism  is  unreasonal)le. 

3.  Tlie  tlieistic  argument  is  complex  and  cumulative.  In 
theistic  proof  each  argument  gives  adequate  reason  for  the 
theistic  conclusion  ;  but  this  conclusion  is  strengthened  by 
the  congruity  and  concurrence  of  all  the  arguments. 

The  theistic  proof  may  be  arranged  under  three  principal 
divisions.  First:  Argument  based  on  idea  of  cause;  Sec- 
ond: Argument  founded  on  our  mond  nature:  Third:  Argu- 
ment based  on  idea  ot  the  Intinite. 

Division  I.— Argument  Based  on  Idea  of  Cause. 

Hegarding  the  world  under  the  concept  of  causation,  we 
may  consider  it  first  as  contingent:  secondly  as  a  cosmos; 
thirdly  as  exhibiting  finality.  Argument  bjised  nn  the  causal 
judgment  will  therefore  take  •>  forms  :  .  Ktiological,  Cos- 
mological,  Teleological. 

A.     Thk   JvriuLocicAi.  AK«;rMi:NT. 

This  treats  phenomena  sim[)ly  as  r<mfi/t(/ffit,  and  may  be 
considered  in  two  ways:  as  applied  to  the  totality  of  phe- 
nomena or  as  applied  to  specific  phenomcnu.  We,  therefore, 
consider  first :  — 


:30 
Basis  <>!    Thkistfc  Inference  in  the  Totality  of  Phe- 

XOMENA. 

Syllogism.  Every  effect  has  a  cause.  The  world  is  an 
effect,  cVc.  Hut  is  the  world  an  effect  ?  Difficult  to  prove 
this  it'  by  'world'  we  mean  the  substance  of  the  world. 
Hence  soine  say  the  a'tiolofi:ical  argument  is  useless  because 
it  assumes  the  non-eternity  of  matter.  But  we  are  not 
required  to  raise  this  question.  The  world  of  our  experience 
is  one  of  phenomenal  successions  in  time  and  co-existences 
in  space.  Does  this  world  demand  a  first  cause;  if  so  what 
cause  ?  Answer  to  this  depends  upon  what  is  meant  by 
causation.  We  notice  therefore  the  leading  theories  ot  cau- 
sation. 

1.  Mill's  Theory.  Mill  (J.  S.)  says  that  '-the  very  essence 
ot  causation  is  incompatible  with  a  tirst  cause."  "  The  cause 
of  any  change  is  a  prior  change."  "  When  I  speak  of  the 
cause  of  a  phenomenon  I  do  not  mean  a  cause  which  is  not 
itself  a  phenomenon."  By  causation  Mill  means  only  the 
relationships  of  phenomena  in  time-successions.  His  theory 
being  conceded  the  impossibility  of  inferring  a  first  cause 
undoubtedly  follows.  But  to  his  theory  in  its  relations  to 
theism  we  offer  these  objections. 

(a.)  Cause  and  effect  express  relations  (according  to  Mill) 
between  phenomena.  God  as  first  cause  is  thus  ruled  out 
by  definition. 

(/>.)  Cause  and  efiect  express  time-relations  of  phenomena. 
It  is  the  fact  that  A  is  the  invariable  predecessor  under  cer- 
tain circumstances  of  B  that  makes  it  possible  to  call  A  the 
cause  of  B.  But  the  essence  of  causation  is  not  in  invariable 
relationshij*  of  succession  for  this  invai'iability  might  be  pre- 
served where  there  is  no  suggestion  of  cause  and  effect. 

(c.)  Mill  is  shut  u|>  to  an  infinite  regress  of  finite  causes. 
A  cause  is  oidy  a  [>henomenon  and  Qvvry  phenomenon  that 
])eginK  to  l)e  has  a  cause. 

{(/.)  There  can  be  no  law  of  cause  and  effect  under  con- 
ditions where  the  law  ol"  the  unilormity  of  nature  is  not  in 
force.  Were  events  to  happen  without  regularity,  there 
would  be  in  Mill's  view  a  susjjension  of  the  law  of  cause 
and  efiect.  l>ut  no:  the  occurrence  of  an  event  makes  it 
imperative  to  call  for  a  cause.  It  is  the  fact  that  the  event 
/<(/.^  happnied,  not  that  it  has  happened  regularly  that  makes 
it  necessarv  to  ask  Ibi-  its  cause. 


31 

{( .)  Mill  viohitcs  the  |»riiici|>l('s  of  his  own  i'iii|.iricnl  pljil- 
osouliy  and  (.ontradicts  his  (lociriiiu  oi'  causation  hy  appoal- 
\n<r  to  wliat  ho  rails  a  |m  rinanent  clement  in  nature.  *  ''  TIjcre 
is  a  nature,  a  i)ern)anent  element  and  also  a  c]ianL(ea])le  :  tlie 
chani^es  arc  alway.s  the  eliects  of  previous  cliani^es.  The 
permanent  existences  so  far  as  wc  know  are  not  effects  at 
all."  C^ierv:  1.  If  knowledL^'e  is  limited  hy  experience' 
what  do  wc  know  of  a  permanent  in  Nature? 

2.  If  this  permanent,  which  is  not  an  eifrct,  he  "  cause 
or  con  cause  of  evei'ythin<;-  that  takes  j»la(.*e,*'  how  can  it  he 
true  that  every  cause  is  also  an  cllcct  ? 

(/.)  It  would  he  impossihle,  as  Mr  Shiiir  ha>  shown, 
accordin*!^  to  Mill's  definition  of  cause,  ever  to  discover  a 
cause.  For,  accordin«^  to  this  doctrine,  the  cause  of  a  phe- 
nomenon is  not  a  sinjj^le  antecedent  and  necessarily  related 
phenomenon  :  hut  that  phenomenon  as  conditioned  hy  all  the 
circumstances  near  and  more  remote  which  have  effected  it. 

MilTs  doctrine  amounts  to  sayini^  that  the  phvsical  uni- 
verse at  any  one  moment  is  the  eff'ect  of  all  j)liysical  ante- 
cedents for  all  past  time.  Clearly  from  this  view  of  causa- 
tion we  can  infer  no  first  cause.  W  the  only  causes  of  [)}ie- 
nomena  he  themselves  phenomena  demanding  causes  in 
explanation  of  them,  then  an  uncaused  cause  is  ahsunh 

2.  Theory  of  pure  physical  causation.  If  the  factors  of 
the  universe  he  matter  and  motion,  then  cause  can  only  mean 
the  t)henomenal  antecedents  necessary  to  certain  conse- 
quents. And  we  conclude  (1)  every  jdiysical  phenomenon  is 
necessarily  determined  l)y  physical  antecedents:  (2)  there 
has  heen  an  infinite  regress  of  physical  antecedents:  (3)  all 
so-called  free  actions  liave  heen  physically  determined.  A 
first  cause  in  tlie  sense  demanded  l)v  theism  is  im|>ossil)le. 
Moreover  the  i'vae  action  of  our  own  wills  is  ohliterhted 
and  our  volitions  take  their  place  in  a  row  of  physical  an- 
tecedents. 

3.  Theory  of  the  persistence  of  Force.  As  taught  hy 
Spencer  it  is  the  doctrine  that  all  forms  of  existence  are 
the  manifestations  of  a  ]»ower  at  once  omnijiotent  and  in- 
comjirehensihle.  "In  this  consciousness  of  an  omnipotent 
power  w  ('  have  that  consciousness  in  which  luligion 
dwells,  and  so  we  arrive  at  that  jioint  where  lidigion  and 
Science  coalesce"  (Spencer).  We  agree  with  !)iman  in  say- 
ing that  the  doctrine  of  a  first  cause  has  not  heen  wiped  out 
hy  the  doctrine  oi  force.     If  the  idea  of  causation  yielded 


32 

this  and  iiotliiiii;-  iiiorr,  that  there  is  an  incomprehensible 
but  omnipotent  power  that  is  the  ultimate  cause  of  all  phe- 
nomenon, we  should  use  thivS  as  the  basis  of  a  theistic 
ari^uuK'iit.  I)nt  there  are  objections  to  this  view  of  causa- 
tion. It  is  half  wav  between  theism  and  materialism.  If 
Force  be  an  entity  distinct  from  matter  and  its  manifesta- 
tions tile  diti'erenee  between  this  theory  and  theism  is  that 
force  is  not  invested  with  the  attributes  of  Intelligence.  The 
theory  as  thus  understood  is  semi  theistic  and  consistency 
will  require  it  to  advance  to  the  full  theistic  position.  If 
on  the  other  hand.  Force  be  not  an  entity  but  a  term  ex- 
pressing rate  or  ratio  of  motion,  work  done,  kc,  the  theory 
resolves  itselt  into  that  of  pure  physical  causation.  This 
again  is  physical  determinism,  and  to  be  complete,  must 
include  mind  and  will.  If,  however,  volition  be  not  capa- 
ble of  physical  explanation,  as  it  is  not,  then  we  have  a  large 
area  of  etfeets  which  cannot  be  explained  by  the  doctrine  of 
the  persistence  of  Force.  Physical  causation  in  other  words 
is  not  the  only  causation. 

4.  Accordingly  we  have  the  common  doctrine  of  dual 
causation  whieh  recognizes  will  as  a  cause — a  first  cause, 
and  physieal  phenomena  as  second  causes.  It  is  held  by  many 
that  [jersonal  agency  is  the  type  of  all  causation :  that  we  speak 
of  physieal  eauses  because  we  impute  to  matter  a  power  akin 
to  that  of  whieh  we  are  conscious  when  we  effect  change  by 
the  exercise  of  our  wills.  But  whatever  be  the  truth  respect- 
ing the  nature  of  physical  causation  the  theistic  argument 
based  upon  cause  derives  its  force  from  our  experience  of 
personal  agency.  The  ^etiological  argument  is  simply  the 
Aristotelian  argument  for  a  first  mover.  From  our  expe- 
rience of  power  and  from  our  belief  in  regard  to  the  inabil- 
ity of  matter  to  orii^inate  motion,  we  are  led  to  believe  that 
however  related  to  one  another  physical  phenomena  may 
be,  there  must  behind  them  all  be  a  will  as  the  original 
cause  of  motion. 

.').  Volitional  theory  of  causation.  It  is  held  by  many  that 
the  only  real  cause  in  the  world  is  a  will.  Whether  this 
volitional  theory  of  causation  be  accepted  or  not,  and  whether 
an  infinite  i-egress  of  pliysical  antecedents  be  thinkable  or 
n(jt,  it  is  certain  that  the  mind  naturally  seeks  for  a  case  of 
real  beginning.  We  are  not  satisfied  with  a  cause  that  is 
also  an  effect.  It  is  certain  that  the  only  thing  in  experience 
answering  to  this  demand  is  our  will.     So  that  contemplat- 


33 

\n^  tlie  world  ol"  pliciioniciia — anteccMloiit.s  jiiid  conscMiiifiits — 
we  are  left  to  ac'ce|tt  an  inliriite  re«;ress  ot"  plivHical  cauHefl, 
or  to  believe  that  jdivsical  cliaiiue  is  diri'cth-  or  iiior«,' 
remotely  related  to  tlic  will. 

The  arLTunient  (f  co/ifhif/cn/i/i  mmuli  concenis  plu'uoineiia. 
It  does  not  cojiccrn  itself  with  the  ([Uestion  of  suhstance  or 
the  eternity  of  matter.  The  non-eternity  of  matter  may  l)e 
argued  on  the  i^round  of  the  law  of  jiarsimony  (that  is,  the- 
ism Ixiiii^-  ( oiici'ded,  thi'i'e  is  no  need  ol"  helievin;^  in  the 
eternity  of  matter),  as  followini^  i'rom  the  doctrine  of  the  dis- 
sipation of  enerii'y,  or  on  tiie  iz:round  of  a  dynamic  theory  of 
matter:  hut  it  is  not  necessary  to  know  that  atoms  had  a 
heginnin*]^  in  order  to  come  to  the  theistic  inference  through 
the  doctrine  of  causation.     We  consider  next  : 

Basis  of  Thkistic  rNFEKENCK  in  Spkcific  Phenomena. 

Certain  phenomena,  because  they  cannot  be  accounted  for 
by  antecedent  physical  phenomena,  suggest,  if  they  do  not 
require,  the  hyi)othesis  of  the  divine  intelligence  for  their  ex- 
planation. Existence  of  life  and  the  human  mind  are  exam- 
ples of  these.  Arguments  for  divine  existence  based  upon 
the  human  n;iiul  have  been  presented  in  two  forms;  by  John 
Locke  and  Sir  Wm.  Hamilton.  Locke's  argument,  given 
in  Part  L,  criticised  l)y  Physicus,  who  says  that  we  liave  no 
proof  that  only  mind  can  ]>roduce  mind ;  and  moreover, 
that  it  is  as  inconceivable  tliat  mind  should  be  the  cause  o{' 
matter  as  that  matter  should  be  the  cause  of  niind.  This, 
however,  is  easily  said,  and  for  reply,  each  must  refer  to  his 
own  consciousness. 

Hamilton's  argument  is  founded  in  the  incommeasurable 
character  of  the  attributes  of  mind  and  matter.  From  mind 
ill.  man  he  found  the  [»assage  easy  to  mind  in  nature. 
fLamilton  erred  in  discouraging  all  other  theistic  proof. 
But  iiis  argument  is  not  without  force,  and  it  cannot  be 
answered  except  by  teaching  physical  determinism.  In 
other  words,  unless  materialism  succeeds  in  making  men 
skeptical  about  their  (^wn  minds  tliere  will  always  be  an 
open  way  from  mind  in  man  to  the  tnind  of  God. 

P).  The  Cosmoiaxjk'al  Ak<;iment. 

Distinguish  between  the  aigumeiit  based  on  order  and 
that  based  on  filial  causes.     All  cases  of  tinalitv  are  instances 


34 

of  orcU'r,  l>ut  all  instances  of  onk'r  arc  not  a(la[>tatioiis  of 
moans  to  eiuls.  Neither  the  eosmological  nor  the  teleolog- 
ioal  art^^ument  is  affected  hy  a  nieclianieal  ex[>lanation  of  the 
facts  ot  tlie  world.  In  cosniolo2:ical  ari::ument  we  see  order 
and  infer  a  plan  antecedently  existing  in  an  intellio:ent  mind. 
In  the  telcoloirical  arii-nnient  we  see  adai)tation  of  means  to 
ends  and  infer  finality,  and  also  infer  mind  as  the  cause  of 
that  finality.  The  cosmological  argument,  that  is  to  say,  the 
argument  based  upon  order,  proceeds  upon  the  assumption 
that  order  is  the  prochict  of  mind.  The  order  of  the  world 
is  a  great  fact.  Time,  number,  I'utc,  ratio  and  volume,  are 
all  matters  oi  most  definite  and  precise  nature,  and  the 
j»liysical  world  is  an  exhibition  on  the  grandest  scale  of 
inalhematical  relations.  The  fact  of  order  is  undeniable. 
Some  ex]»lanation  of  the  fact  is  demanded.  Theism  is  the 
natural  explanation.  Those,  how^ever,  who  deny  the  theistic 
inference  offer  the  following  sul)stitutes  for  it: 

1.  The  theory  of  Chance.  Suppose  we  were  to  concede 
the  possibility  that  by  a  purely  fortuitous  concourse  of  atoms 
the  cosmos  might  have  resulted.  How  much  would  theism 
be  damaged  ?  We  should  say  that  the  credulity  of  the  atheist 
was  amazing.  "Imagine,"  sa3's  Venn,  "some  being  not  a 
creator,  but  a  sort  of  demiurgus  who  has  a  quantity  of 
materials  put  into  his  hand  and  he  assigns  them  their  collo- 
cations and  lines  of  action  l)lindly  and  at  ha|)liazard  ;  what 
are  the  odds  tliat  sucli  a  world  as  we  actually  experience 
should  have  been  brought  about  in  this  way?"  His  answer 
is  that  "  all  the  paper  which  the  world  has  hitherto  produced 
would  be  used  uji  before  we  got  far  on  the  way  in  writing 
them  down." 

'2.  The  theory  of  \n\\.  The  Duke  of  Argyll  sliows  in  his 
Jiti(/n  of  ]j(iir  how  we  advance  from  the  mere  conception  of 
order  to  the  idea  of  force  or  power  in  explanation  of  the 
(»nler.  We  are  not  satisfied  to  say  that  bodies  move  with  a 
certain  regularity — we  seek  an  ex[)lanation  of  this  regularity 
and  embody  it  in  a  forninla.  Then  we  are  not  satisfied  with 
tiie  formula — but  we  impute  the  fact  to  a  force  which  we 
call  the  Law  of  ( Jravitation.  I>ut  however  the  word  Law  is 
used,  it  does  not  affect  theism,  for  if  it  be  not  used  in  some 
transcendental  way  it  means  only  tlie  order  of  sequence. 
If  it  means  more  than  order  it  is  because  it  has  been  hypos- 
tatiscd  and  treated  as  an  entity.  So  that  the  idea  of  law 
leaves  us  when'  we  wen,*  before.     We  must  be  content  to  do 


85 

Avitlioiit  ail  o.\i>laiiali(Hi  of  the  world's  ordur,  or  wu  must 
find  an  explanation  in  Thoisni.  The  world's  order  is  proof 
of  mind.  ''  That  whirh  it  rerpiires  thuni^ht  and  reason  to 
understand  nuist  itself  he  thought  and  reason.  That  whieh 
mind  alone  can  investiicate  or  e.xpress  must  l)e  itself  mind." 
This  is  liadi'ii  i*oweli's  way  of  |)Uttin<;  the  eosmoloirieal 
argument. 

3.  Theory  of  the  persistence  ol  force.  A  mechanical 
oonception  of  the  universe  is  in  the  highest  degree  theistie 
provided  that  mechanical  conception  does  not  include  mind. 
The  ohjection  made  hy  Physicus  proceeds  upon  the  assump- 
tion that  mind  has  a  physical  genesis.  The  theory  of  tlic 
persistence  of  fort-e,  carried  to  its  logical  conclusions,  re- 
duees  the  universe  to  nnitter  and  motion.  If  mind  in  man 
be  denied,  the  Divine  mind,  ol  course,  will  not  he  believed 
in.  No  proof  of  the  Divine  existenee  can  survive  belief  in 
the  human  mitid.  The  theory  of  the  persistenee  of  force 
when  earried  the  length  of  materialisti*!  monism,  blots  out 
the  theistie  argument  as  Physicus  shows.  It  l)lots  out  belief 
by  blotting  out  the  basis  of  belief  But  it  blots  out  the 
possibility  of  rational  belief  in  anything  including  the  per- 
sistenee of  foree. 

C.     Tei.eolocical   AR(^.UMENT. 

Commonly  known  as  argument  from  final  eause  or  design. 
By  iinal  eause  is  meant  the  end  for  whieh  a  thing  or  an 
event  exists.  Distinguislied  tlius  from  etlieient  eause  which 
always  means  the  agency  by  which  anytliing  is  brought 
about.  Following  Janet  wo  consider  the  teleologieal  argu- 
ment by  instituting  two  inquiries  : 

1.  Is  finality  a  law  of  nature? 

2.  What  is  the  cause  of  this  finality? 

T.  Is  JimiUlu  a  Inir  of  jSatior?  Consider  lirst,  the  nature 
of  the  process  by  which  we  are  led  to  believe  that  there  are 
ends  in  nature:  Secondly,  the  specific  proofs  in  supj^ort  of 
finality;  Thirdly,  the  objections  to  the  doctrine  of  finality. 

1.  Nature  of  teleologieal  argument.  Porter  holds  (in- 
clusively) that  the  idea  of  final  cause  is  an  intuition.  Mill 
says  that  it  is  an  inductive  argument  according  to  the 
method  of  agreement.  The  latter  view  jjrobably  correct. 
We  are  unde'r  no  necessity  to  ask  for  the  final  cause  as  we 
are  for  the  efiicient  cause  of  every  phenomenon.  In  teleo- 
logieal   reasoning   we    argue  analogically.     The    argument 


36 

lias  two  stages.  In  the  tirst  lAave  we  know  from  our  expe- 
rience that  a  certain  ideal  future  to  be  brouglit  about  stands 
rehited  to  certain  means  necessary  to  the  accomplishing  of 
this  result.  A  and  B  are  related  to  each  other  as  means 
and  ends.  Passing  from  our  own  consciousness  to  tacts 
outside  of  consciousness  we  see  phenomena  related  in  a  way 
that  irresistibly  suggests  the  relation  of  means  and  ends: 
we  say  B  was  the  final  cause  of  A.  The  tirst  stage  in  the 
argument  ends  in  the  realization  of  linality  as  a  law  of 
nature.  The  phenomena  of  the  world  look  as  if  they  were 
respectively  means  and  ends.  The  next  question  is  as  to 
the  cause  of  the  finality.  Again  we  revert  to  our  experience 
and  since  the  only  finality  of  which  he  have  any  knowledge 
is  that  of  a  purposing  mind — in  other  words,  since  finality 
im[)lies  intentionality  in  our  conscious  experience  the  in- 
ference from  finality  to  intentionality  is  rational  if  not 
necessary. 

2.  Specific  evidence  of  finality.  The  proof  of  finality  con- 
sists in  the  cumulative  force  of  a  great  multitude  of  as  ifs. 
It  looks  as  if  the  wide  domain  of  nature  were  a  great  sys- 
tem of  ideals,  as  if  striving  toward  an  end  were  the  great 
characteristic  of  nature.  To  prove  finality  we  begin  with  the 
purposive  action  of  which  we  are  ourselves  conscious.  Then 
we  see  actions  of  our  fellow  men  which  seem  to  be  dictated 
by  purpose  and  directed  to  attain  an  end.  Descending  a 
step,  the  actions  of  the  lower  animals  irresistibly  impress 
us  as  purposive.  Lower  still  we  come  to  a  point  where  the 
action  as  definitely  suggests  adaptation  though  we  do  not 
credit  the  animal  with  intention.  Analogy  thus  suggests 
that  action  with  reference  to  results  whether  consciously  or 
unconsciously  is  every  where  manifest  throughout  animal 
life.  We  turn  then  to  the  relation  of  organ  to  function  ; 
the  relation  of  the  eye  to  vision.  We  find  that  there  is  a 
close  and  apparently  premeditated  relation  between  organ 
and  organism,  organism  and  environment.  We  argue: 
These  adaptations  are  not  accidents.  They  are  intentional. 
They  l)es|)eak  pur|)ose  and  designing  mind.  The  same 
teleologieal  trend  of  things  is  manifest  in  the  world.  Things 
in  the  world  sustain  a  relation  of  lower  and  higher.  Finality 
in  nature  is  proved  by  showing  that  there  is  the  closest 
analogy  between  the  relation  of  |)art  and  part,  and  part  and 
whole,  in  tlie  organic  world,  that  there  is  between  means 
and  ends  in  the  sphere  of  our  purposive  action. 


37 

n.  ( )li)L'cti()iis  to  tin- (InctriiH- <.r  tiiinl  caiiHeH,  'riichf  tall 
niMk'i'  tliivc  classrs. 

1.  Ii  Trli'vant  oltjcctioFis  : 

{<i  )  liacou's  otU'ii  (juoted  (>l>"n'rti<»n  «1(U'>  not  apply  l«>  linal 
cause  as  a  fact,  Imt  to  the  seardi  tor  tiiial  cause  as  useieiilitic 
method.      All  that  liaeoti  says  may  l>e  coneedejl. 

{!).)  80  of  Dos  Cartes'  ohjeetion.  lie  says  wean*  ii^noraiit 
of  ends.  80  we  ari'.  And  if  we  were  pretrndiiii;  to  know 
the  final  cause  of  every  event  tiie  ohjretion  would  l»e  val'Hl. 

(<'.)  Irrelevant,  also,  the  ol)jeetion  that  the  doctrine  ot' final 
cause  assumes  that  man  is  the  final  cause  ot' creation.  It  is 
surely  not  necessary  to  hold  that  every  thinir  was  nuule  for 
man,  hecause  man's  eye  was  made  for  sci-inir. 

((L)  Nor  can  we  ij^et  rid  of  final  cjiuse,  hecause  somi*  have 
abused  it.  Some  have  treated  every  possihlc  tisc  of  an  origan 
as  an  intended  use,  and  in  tiiis  wjjy  have  heaped  ridicule 
upon  teleoloiry. 

2.  Biological  objections. 

It  is  said  that  the  doctrine  of  final  lause  is  hard  to  recon- 
cile with  the  rudimentary  and  useless  organs  to  he  found  in 
animals.     To  this  objection  it  is  rejdied  : 

1.  It  is  not  affirmed  that  (fay  detail  of  organization  was 
meant  to  serve  a  useful  purpose.  '2.  Wc  do  not  know  that 
an  organ  has  no  uses  because  we  do  not  see  its  uses.  3. 
Obvious  finality  in  a  multitude  (»f  cases  is  not  set  aside  by 
apparent  lack  of  linality  in  other  cases.  4.  These  rudimen- 
tary organs  are  explaimd)le  without  denying  teleology;  and 
by  some  are  so  ex[)lained  so  as  to  give  emphasis  to  the 
teleological  idea. 

3.  Objections  urged  by  the  anli-teleological  evolutionists. 
Whether  evolution  be  true  is  not  the  <piesti(»ii.     If  true, 

is    it    contradictory    to    teleology?     Can    it    dispense    with 
teleology  ? 

Jane't  and  others  hold  tluit  evolution,  in  the  first  place, 
does  not  contradict  teleology.  The  process  of  evolution, 
conceding  the  truth  of  the  hypothesis,  is  only  a  mode  of  the 
Divine  procedure.  That  is  to  say  the  order,  the  ada|»tations, 
the  harmonies  of  the  world  are  here  and  an-  manifest,  and 
they  suggest  God,  whatever  the  ])rocess  may  have  been  by 
which  tiiey  have  been  brought  about.  But  two  cpiestions  are 
to  be  distinguished.  It  is  one  thing  to  say  that  the  doctrme 
of  evolution  tolerates  theism,  and  another  thing  t(»  say  that 
it  gives  support  to  theism.     l\  belief  in  (b.d  .an  be  arrived 


38 

at  through  other  channels,  undoubtedly  it  is  possible  to  say, 
and  it  is  the  correct  thing  to  say,  that  evolution  is  only  the 
mode  of  His  working. 

P>ut  the  more  important  question  is,  whether  evolution, 
in  itself  considered,  is  or  is  not  antagonistic  to  teleology. 
This  (piestion  lias  been  speciiically  raised  in  regard  to  Dar- 
win's doctrine  of  the  Orifjia  of  Species.  Upon  this  subject 
two  things  are  to  be  said  : 

(a.)  That  the  unmodified  Darwinian  doctrine  of  tendency 
to  indetinite  variation  in  all  directions  as  the  foundation  of 
species  ends  in  giving  us  a  chance  world,  so  far  as  biology  is 
concerned.     It  is  anti-teleological,  therefore. 

{h)  That  if  variation  be  not  in  all  directions;  if  there  has 
been  a  law  of  variation  ;  a  law  of  selection  manifest ;  if  it  is 
in  accordance  with  some  inner  law  of  development  that  the 
present  system  of  ordered  life  has  grown  up,  there  is  a 
teleological  principle  evidently  at  work  in  nature.  This 
view  is  held  by  nuiny,  and  this  is  what  Janet  means  when  he 
aifirnis  that  the  doctrine  of  evolution  cannot  dispense  with 
teleology. 

//.     \V/"i/  is  Ihe  Expkinatlon  of  the  Finality  in  Nature. 

To  this  (jucstion  four  answers  have  been  given:  1.  Sub- 
jective tinality.  •!.  Immanent  finality.  3.  Unconscious  fin- 
ality.    4.   Intentional  tinality. 

1.  Subjective  finality.  This  is  Kant's  doctrine  which 
Jani't  interprets  to  mean,  that  w^hile  tinality  is  a  necessary 
liypothesis  given  the  conformation  of  the  human  mind, 
nothing  warrants  us  to  suppose  that  this  hypothesis  has  an 
objective  foundation  in  reality.  Tliis  is  simply  the  doctrine 
of  relativity.      Upon  this  we  remark  : 

{(I.)  If  we  were  under  the  necessity  of  seeing  hnality  in 
every  thitig,  tlien  subjective  finality  would  be  the  best 
guarantee  of  objective  finality.     It  would  be  an  a  priori ivwih. 

[h.)  But  there  is  no  sucl)  subjective  necessity.  And  since 
we  see  finality  in  some  tlTnigs  and  not  in  others,  there  must 
be  some  objective  ground  for  this  distinction. 

'1.  Immanent  tinality.  The  Hegelian  doctrine  affirms 
linality,  but  cre(lits  it  to  the  activity  of  luiture  and  denies  a 
personal  (iod.  Kant  paved  the  way  for  it  by  noticing  two 
important  points  of  distinction  :  First.  That  works  of  art 
and  those  of  nature  differ  in  this  respect,  that  in  the  former 


30 

tlu'  ai^oiit  >iaiiiU  (HiLsidf  di  Ins  work;  whili-  iii  naturr  it  in 
aiiu'reiit.  Xaimi'  lias  a  torinative,  reparative  ami  repro- 
<luctivo  power  which  (listiiiLriii?<hes  her  works  trom  those  of 
human  art.  Si-coiidls.  Kant  made  the  distinetioii  between 
extrinsic  and  intrinsic  I'lids.  It  is  l)y  emphasisin*;  extrinsic 
ends  that  teleoK)i::y  ^^'^^^  I'aih'n  into  disrepute.  An  or^aniHin 
may  serve  some  external  and  extrinsie  purpose;  l)Ut  it  18  it- 
self the  realisation  of  an  end  in  exhihitimr  a  certain  type  of 
organic  existence.  An  ideal  has  heen  realised  in  the  (»ri,M!i- 
ism,  whatever  external  end  it  nn«y  afterwards  serve.  IIe<;el 
emphasised  intrinsic,  or  immanent,  as  ojtposed  to  extrinsie 
finality.      Upon  this  suhject,  wc  remark  : 

(a.)  The  Hegelian  doctrine  is  an  nnc<|uivocal  concession 
in  favor  of  the  teleological  argument. 

(6.)  We  must  distinguish  hetween  finality  and  tlie  eause  of 
finality.  Ilegel  agrees  with  the  Theist  in  afHrming  the  fact. 
He  differs  with  him  in  his  explanation  of  it.  There  is  nothing 
in  immanent  finality  to  interfere  with  legitimate  teh-ology. 
Theism  is  not  compromised  by  immanence. 

{('.)  Though  the  distinction  hetween  external  and  internal 
ends  be  a  valid  one,  it  is  impossible  always  to  se|»arate  one 
from  the  other.  Our  bodilv  ori^anization  is  a  system  con- 
sisting  of  the  adaptation  of  part  to  jtart.  The  eye  is  a  sy.s- 
tem.  The  several  parts  of  the  ])ody  are  systems.  Kaeh 
system  realises  its  end  as  being  a  system.  But  the  whole 
body  realises  its  end  as  a  system  only  by  the  cor)rdination 
and  adaptation  of  systems  to  each  other. 

(d.)  Hegel  affirms  that  the  finality  of  the  world  is  not  con- 
scious and  free,  but  only  the  activity  of  nature.  This,  how- 
ever, is  not  argument. 

3.  Unconscious  finality.  This  is  the  doctrine  of  Scho- 
penhauer and  Hartmann.  and  difiers  little  from  that  of 
Hegel.  It  admits  the  finality  of  nature;  affirms  intelligence 
as  accounting  for  that  finality,  but  maintain  that  this  is  an 
unconscious  intelligence.  This  theory  protests  against  an 
anthropomorphic  conce})ti()n  of  (iod,  and  gives  us  a  zciMuor- 
phic  conce[)tion  of  nature. 

4.  Intentional  finality.  If  it  is  true  that  finality  is  stamped 
upon  nature,  the  question  is  whether  it  is  more  rational  to 
say  that  this  finality  is  the  product  of  a  blindly  operating 
nature,  or  that  it  is  the  result  of  intelligent  foresight  and 
intention.  By  so  much  as  the  latter  is  more  rational,  by  that 
much  is  theism  more  worthv  of  our  consideration  than  the 


40 

substitutes  tor  it  that  liave  been  under  consideration. 
Theism  is  that  theory  of  tlie  universe  that  exphiins  the 
adaptation  of  means  to  ends  in  the  universe  by  the  doctrine 
of  intentional  tinality. 

Division  II.  Arcjument  Based  on  Conscience. 

The  word  conscience  stands  for  both  the  ethical  and  the 
rehi^ious  side  of  man's  nature.  Accordin<^ly  the  theistic 
proofs  sui2:i;ested  1>\-  the  woi'd  maN'  l)e  considered  under  two 
heads. 

A.     The  Ethical  Argument. 

Vro\'.  Fhnt  (h)es  not  think  tliat  tlie  moral  arij^ument  is  con- 
cerned with  the  questions  now  under  discussion  regarding' 
the  genesis  of  conscience.  His  position  seems  to  be  that  we 
must  choose  between  theism  and  absolute  slcepticism.  If 
conscience  tells  the  truth  there  is  moral  obligation  and 
a  moral  governor;  if  conscience  does  not  tell  the  truth 
authoritative  morality  is  at  an  end.  Professor  Flint  is 
probably  wrong  in  supposing  that  this  theistic  discussion  can 
ignore  current  debate  on  Ethical  questions. 

The  great  topics  of  Ethical  study  are:  1.  Duty;  2.  The 
Good;  3.  Virtue.     {Janet     Moral  Science.) 

I.    Ethical  Argument  Based  on  Idea  of  Duty. 

The  two  ideas  under  duty  are  Dtight  and  rif//tL  If  these 
ideas  are  ultimate,  the  theistic  inference  is  natural.  It  i» 
held  by  some  that  they  are  not  ultimate.     Thus  : 

1.  Some,  as  Schopenhauer,  say  there  is  no  legitimate 
place  in  ethics  for  the  word  duty.  It  is  claimed  that  we  may 
describe'  men  as  they  are,  and  classify  them  as  kind  or  cniel^ 
but  tluit  the  word  ought  has  no  meaning. 

2.  The  ideas  ought  and  right  are  held  to  be  derived  from 
T^aw  (Ilol)bes,  Bain).  Conscience  is  an  imitation  in  the 
individual  life  of  the  social  forces  without.  A  human  gov- 
ernment is  a  system  of  conimands  and  penalties.  Moral 
law  is  derived  from  it.  Ought  means  the  expedient.  A 
feeling  that  I  ought  not,  is  only  "  a  strong  sense  of  avoid- 
ance " — a  dread  of  penalty.  No  theistic  inference  from  Idea 
of  I>nty,  if  this  be  (.'orrect  view. 

8.  The  rtilitarian  theory.  (Hentham,  .Mill.)  Kgoistic 
Hedonism  makes  that  conduct  right  which  makes  me  happy. 


41 

UniviMsalistic  Hedonism  ooiisidtTs  tin*  i^rcatrst  liappiiie«rt  of 
the  greatest  nuinl)cr.  To  K^oist'u-  Hedonist  von  say,  '*('()n- 
<luct  can  never  ho  ohliii^atorv.  It  ninst  always  lie  in  ternirt 
of  pleasnre."  Hnt  t(»  Tniversalistie  HedoniHt  you  way, 
**  Why  am  I  ImhukI  to  >e«'k  tlie  i^ri-atest  happinesH  of  the 
greatest  numlicr."  Hr  postnhiti's  ohhi;ati(»n  in  the  Utilita- 
rian nnixim.  Uiit  Im-  does  not  explain  it.  Kxplained  it 
must  he,  liowevei-,  it"  intuitive  morality  is  to  i»e  rtuecessfully 
attacked. 

Utilitarianism  has  t(>  settle  first  whether  tlie  '' ^reatCHt 
Iiappiness"  tin-mnla  is  a  i^eiierali/ation  expressiiiLC  afi  altru- 
istic instinct  or  a  generalization  expressing  an  altruistic 
duty.  If  the  former,  it  ii^nores  the  idea  of  ouLrhtness  ;  if 
the  latter,  it  postulates  it.     In  neither  case  does  it  explain  it. 

4.  The  Kthics  of  evolution.  .\ccordin<;  to  this  theory, 
morality  is  simply  the  conduct  necessary  to  the  continued 
existence  of  society.  It  may  he  asked,  however,  first:  how 
it  happens  that  the  idea  of  ohli«ration  has  i)een  evolved  in 
coimection  with  the  evolution  of  a  morality,  which  is  only 
one  of  expediency.  Second  :  what  is  to  he  said  to  the  nnm 
who  is  told  not  to  do  wroni^  hecause  (h)in«^  wroni^  will  dam- 
age social  tissue,  if  he  says  that  he  (h)es  not  care  anythiui^ 
about  social  tissue  ?  Evolution  ethics  cannot  he  ()hli«xatory ; 
but  evolutionists  cannot  get  rid  of  the  fact  that  the  idea  of 
obliscation  is  here. 

The  word  oue^ht  is  a  stumhliuir-hlock  in  the  way  of  all 
empirical  thinkers.  We  i^rant  that  if  oui^ht  could  he  reduce(l 
to  lower  terms,  it  would  he  hard  to  l)ase  a  theistic  ari^ument 
apon  it.  But  the  attempt  so  to  reduce  it  has  hitherto 
proved  unsuccessful.  The  same  may  l)e  said  tor  the  word 
right.  Oughtness  and  Rightness  are  the  two  irreducihle 
words  concerned  in  the  idea  of  duty.  To  what  do  they 
point  ? 

1.  Some  stop  with  the  consciousness  of  ohiigation,  and 
see  no  theistic  implications  in  it.  Tliey  recognize  the  cat- 
egorical imperative  as  a  psychological  fact,  without  attempt- 
ing any  metaphysical  inferences. 

2.  Some  say  that  Right  means  conformity  to  the  fitness 
of  things. 

-3.  Some  hold  that  there  is  a  principle  of  right  to  which 
God  and  all  moral  things  are  coordinately  related. 

4.  Others,  again,  say  that  morality  depends  upon  the 
Divine  will. 


42 

o.  Wo  holii've  that  the  ideii  of  ouii^htiiess  and  Tightness 
hoth  witness  to  tlio  Divine  existence. 

Assuming  that  God  exists  as  a  moral  governor,  these  ideas 
would  he  the  natural  correlatives  of  that  truth.  The  sense 
of  oughtness  would  he  tlie  natural  correlative  of  man's 
relati()n  to  God  as  a  moral  governor,  and  the  sense  of  Tight- 
ness the  natural  correlative  to  God  as  the  norm  and  model 
of  his  moral  existence. 

II.    Kthical  Ar(Ument  Based  upon  the  Idea  oe  the  Good. 

By  the  Good  is  meant  the  Desirable.  What  is  the  rela- 
tion of  Good  to  Duty? 

(t.  Does  Duty  supersede  the  Good?  Is  it  not  possible  to 
have  a  law  of  duty  defining  conduct  and  also  an  unrealized 
ideal  inspiring  it?  Duty,  as  a  matter  of  experience,  does 
not  supersede  Good. 

b.  Is  the  Good  subordinated  to  Duty  ?  Can  we  say  the 
desirable  is  doing  Right?  Though  Duty  be  regardless  of 
consequences,  consequences  enter  largely  into  the  motives  of 
life.  There  is  in  life  an  aspiration  after  the  ideal  as  well  as 
conformity  to  law. 

c.  Can  the  Dutiful  be  subordinated  to  the  Good?  Is 
obligation  conditioned  by  consequences?  Can  we  say  that 
we  ought  to  do  right  because  doing  Right  makes  for  our 
highest  happiness?  Xo.  This  resolves  obligation  into  ex- 
pediency. This  substantially  is  Janet's  system  of  "  rational 
Eudemonism." 

Duty  and  Good  are  coordinate.  Both  have  place.  What 
then  is  the  (iood  ?  What  is  the  Desirable?  Is  it  wealthy 
power,  iame,  luxury?  [n  short  is  it  pleasure?  Suppose 
with  Descartes  and  othei-s,  we  say  it  is  the  perfection  of  our 
being  and  its  accom[)anying  ha[)i>iness,  then  there  is  an  ideal 
that  we  desire  to  realize?  There  is  an  ideal  (lood.  What 
are  we  to  infer? 

The  Pessimist  will  say  that  this  is  the  misery  of  human 
nature  that  it  sighs  after  unrealizable  ideals. 

But  if  we  ai'e  not  pessimists  we  shall  regard  the  ii'resisti- 
ble  idea  of  the  (jood  as  prophetic  of  its  realization.  This 
caji  only  l)e  if  we  are  immortal.  Immortality  therefore, 
Hays  Kant,  is  a  postulate  of  our  n)oral  nature.  This  can 
oidy  l)e  through  the  agency  of  a  purposing  and  all-con- 
trolling Being  wlio  shapes  all  ends.  (Jod,  says  Kant,  is  the 
postulate  of  our  nioi-al  nature. 


43 

It  is  hard  to  sojmrate  the  thoiiLcht  ot  an  ideal  (iood  as  the 
iiieasiire  of  our  pei'Cer'tion  tVom  tliat  ot  an  Ahsohiti'  (tood  as 
of  a  heiiii^  wlio  realizes  ill  liimselfall  perfection.  Seedaiiet: 
MordI  Sriowi.      Harris:    l*liil()soi)hi((tl  llnsis  of   Tlnism. 

Attain  :  The  idea  ot  Duty  re<^ardless  of  e()nse(iueiK'e8  and 
tlie  idea  of  the  Good  eoneerned  altogether  with  consequences 
are  hoth  factors  in  our  moral  life.  They  niiglit  he  in  con- 
flict. Su})j)ose  tlie  felicitic  conduct  were  tlie  uronir  conduct. 
Suppose  doing  right  always  made  us  miserahle.  Ifow  does 
it  haj)pen  that  duty  and  the  gocxl  are  in  such  complete 
accord  ?  We  get  hai)[)iness  hy  doing  right,  yet  we  are  not 
to  do  right  for  the  sake  of  happiness.  'Jlieism  will  account 
for  this  harmony.  AV'^e  do  not  know  how  otherwise  it  can 
be  accounted  for.  If  God  proposes  to  hring  about  the  blessed 
perfection  of  the  individual  it  is  not  strange  that  what  with 
Him  is  an  end  should  be  foreshadowed  in  man  as  the  good. 
And  if  this  perfection  is  to  be  brought  about  through  per- 
formance of  right  conduct  it  is  not  strange  there  should  be 
this  harmony  between  Duty  and  Good. 

in.  Ethical  Ar(;ument  Based  on   Idea  of  Virtie. 

Duty  says  what  we  ought  to  do.  The  Good  wliat  we  de- 
sire to  become.  Virtue  is  the  realization  of  Duty  in  cliar- 
acter.  Under  the  word  Virtue  we  have  not  the  bare  category 
Right,  but  the  category  tilled  with  content.  We  say  this  or 
that  is  right.  How  has  this  category  of  Right  been  tilled? 
How,  for  cxamj)le,  do  we  know  that  trutli  telling  is  right  ?  Is 
it  by  Intuition,  Revelation  or  P^volution  ?  If  through  the  tirst 
or  second  the  theistic  inference  will  not  be  doubted.  Supjiose 
it  is  l)y  tlie  thir(L  Then  how  does  it  ha})i)en  that  the  same  pro- 
cess of  evolution  which  has  named  as  virtues  the  linesof  con- 
duct most  promotive  of  social  well-lieing  has  also  generated 
the  feeling  that  well-being  is  not  the  reason  ti)r  performing  the 
con(bict.  IR>w  does  it  hai^pen  that  evolution  has  singled  out 
certain  felicitic  conduct  as  virtue  and  lias  also  generated  the 
maxim  of  obligation  which  tells  us  to(h><iuty  without  regard 
to  happiness.  How  does  it  lia})pen  that  the  natural  history 
of  virtue  can  be  written  under  the  hypothetical  imperative  : 
"This  is  what  you  must  do  /V  you  wish  to  be  happy"; 
while  the  maxim  uf  virtue  is  the  categorical  imperative: 
'*  Do  this,  come  what  may." 

There  are  two  ways  in  which  ethic  of  evoluti(»n  may  be  re- 
garded,    Hii    the    one    hand,    W  oitf/hfncts   (unl   rightness   be 


44 

siolvcii  into  simpkT  constituents,  you  have  no  ethical  atom  in 
either  of  these  words,  and  can  build  no  tlieistic  argument 

on  them.  .        ,        ,  ^      „ 

On  the  other  hand,  it  society  has  been  grackially  moving 
from  the  simple  to  the  more  complex,  and  has  developed 
these  ideas  of  duty  and  good,  fundamentally  distinct,  yet  so 
harmonious,  it  is  not  possible  to  account  for  the  development 
of  tliese  ideas,  their  harmony  and  their  union  in  virtue, 
without  resorting  to  a  teleological  explanation — in  short, 
without  presupposing  God.  The  ethic  of  evolution  does 
not  destroy,  but  it  changes  the  form  of  the  moral  argument. 

P>.    The  Religious  Argument. 

Under  this  would  properly  be  discussed  :  1.  The  psycho- 
loo-y  of  reliicion.  2.  The  metaphysical  inferences.  It  would 
api^ear  that  religion  is  not  exclusively  a  matter  of  intellect, 
feelins:  or  life,  but  the  synthesis  of  all.  And  the  inference 
to  a  being  the  objective  counterpart  of  the  universal  religi- 
ous tendency  would  be  the  outcome  of  the  common  argu- 
ment E  coKsensa  (jotiiinii. 

Division    HI.     Aikjument    Based    on    the    Idea    of    the 

Infinite. 

Distinguish  between  (1)  the  idea  of  the  infinite,  and  (2)  the 
theistic  signiticance  of  the  idea. 

1.  The  i<lea.  Dr.  McCosh  puts  it  among  the  intuitions. 
Locke  and  empirical  philosophers  generally  account  for  it 
V)y  exercise  of  imagination  in  connection  with  experience  of 
the  finite.  P>ut  whatever  the  conditions  under  which  the 
idea  emerges  as  a  fact  of  consciousness,  it  complies  with  the 
canons  of  intuitionalism.  The  idea  is  not  limited  in  applica- 
tion to  time  and  space.  We  cannot  conceive  of  any  degree 
of  knowledire  as  exhausting  the  knowable.  We  speak  of 
infinite  truth,  holiness,  justice.  So  used,  the  word  infinite 
does  not  differ  much  from  the  perfect  or  the  absolute.  We 
cannot  realise  dependent,  finite,  contingent  existence  with- 
out tiiinking  of  infinite,  perfect,  absolute  existence.  We 
cannot  conceive  the  infinite  in  the  sense  of  making  a  mental 
image  of  it.  On  the  other  hand  and  in  another  sense,  we 
cannot  help  conceiving  of  it. 


2.    Its  Tiikistic  Skinificanck. 

1.  Sc'lic'llini'"  tanii:lit  llial  llic  iiifiiiilc  or  absolute  in  iiiiuio- 
diatoly  known.  This  view  was  repeated  l»y  Sir  William 
Hamilton,  wiio  sliowed  that  aeeordini^  to  tiie  delinitioiis  of 
the  words  absolute  and  infinite,  the  iidinite  cannot  know  and 
cannot  he  known;  cannot,  because  that  a  knowin«j:  absolute 
and  a  known  absolute,  is  no  absolute  at  all. 

2.  Hamilton's  doctrine  of  Xescieiice.  See  I)r.  Ilod^^e's 
chai)ter,  Can  God  be  Knoicn?  ILunilton  tries  to  show  that 
wo  can  have  no  knowledge  of  God;  that  we  must  take  our 
choice  between  inconceivables,  witli  tiie  assurance  that  these 
inconceivaldes  being  conti'adictory  lu'opositions,  one  or  the 
other  must  be  ti'ue  ;  and  ha\in<ij  made  it  easy  tor  us  by  his 
law'  of  the  conditioned  to  believe  the  inconceivable,  he  tried 
to  make  up  for  our  lack  of  knowledi^e  by  loij:ical  vindication 
of  our  faith.  Mansel  followed  in  his  Li/iiits  of  Jidifjiou.s 
ThoiKjhi^  desi<2^ned  to  be  a  new  apologetic,  and  intended  to 
show  that  the  ditilculties  of  theology  are  oidy  tiiose  of  all 
thought,  that  since  we  must  believe  the  im-onceivable  in 
philosojdiy,  we  may  believe  the  inconceivable  in  theology. 
The  most  popular  application  of  the  Ilamiltonian  })hilos()phy 
is  not  found  in  Mansel's  a[)ologetic,  but  in  S})encer's  agnos- 
ticism. 

3.  Dr.  Calderwood  holds  that  we  have  an  intuitive  know- 
ledge of  an  iniinite  personal  God.  Jle  cannot  be  said  to 
have  succeeded.  Men  do  not  have  the  same  sort  of  intuitive 
belief  in  an  intinite  God  that  they  (\o  in  regard  to  time  and 
space,  or  tliere  would  be  no  atheists. 

4.  We  do  not  immediately  know  the  Infinite.  Nor  is  it 
true  that  we  cannot  thiid<  of  the  Infinite  except  under  con- 
tradictory attributes.  Nor  do  we  have  an  intuitive  and 
necessary  belief  in  the  objective  existence  of  an  infinite 
Being.  Nevertheless  the  idea  of  the  intinite  i-  an  import- 
ant factor  in  theistic  inference.  AVe  have  this  idea.  It 
emerii^es  in  connection  with  every  experience  of  what  is 
finiteand  relative.  It  is  involved  in  every  <legree  of  emi)ir- 
ical  excellence,  as  the  norm  ov  standard  of  excellence.  We 
cannot  think  of  Right  or  (Jood  without  thiid<ing  of  an  ab- 
solute norm  or  standard.  The  infinite  or  absolute  is  another 
w^ord  for  the  ideal.  What  inlerpretation  sliall  we  put  upon 
this  ideal  ?  The  (piestion  is  not  how  we  get  it,  but  wliat 
it  means.     We  believe  that  it  is  u  strong  conlirnuition  of 


46 


the  theistic  view  of  the  world,  partly  because  of  the  large 
place  it  holds  in  the  human  mind  and  partly  too  because  of 
the  inevitable  impression  into  which  we  fall  it  we  cone  ude 
there  is  no  objective  norm,  no  absolute  standard  by  which 
all  upward  <,rrowth  is  measured,  by  which  all  relative  truth 
and  goodness  is  judged. 


